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ments.Stock Market Misvaluation and Corporate Investment
This paper explores whether and why misvaluation a®ects corporate investment by com-
paring tangible and intangible investments; and by using a price-based misvaluation
proxy that ¯lters out scale and earnings growth prospects. Capital, and especially R&D
expenditures increase with overpricing; but only among overvalued ¯rms. Misvaluation
a®ects investment both directly (catering) and through equity issuance. The sensitivity
of capital expenditures to misvaluation is stronger among ¯nancially constrained ¯rms;
for R&D this di®erential is strong and in the opposite direction. We identify several other
factors that in°uence the strength of misvaluation e®ects on investment. Generally the
equity channel reinforces direct catering, suggesting that the two are complementary.
Overall, our evidence supports several implications of the misvaluation hypothesis for
the tangible and intangible components of investment.1 Introduction
Both e±cient and ine±cient market theories imply that higher stock prices should be
associated with higher corporate investment. Under the q theory of investment (Tobin
(1969)), markets are e±cient, so that a high stock price re°ects strong growth opportu-
nities. It follows that a high-priced ¯rm should invest more.
Under what we call the misvaluation hypothesis, ¯rms respond to overvaluation by
investing more. Equity overvaluation can stimulate investment by encouraging the ¯rm
to raise more equity capital (Stein (1996), Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003), Gilchrist,
Himmelberg, and Huberman (2005)), thereby exploiting new shareholders for the bene¯t
of existing shareholders.1 If the market overvalues the ¯rm's new investment opportu-
nities, the ¯rm may commit to additional investment in order to obtain a high price for
newly issued equity.
However, the misvaluation hypothesis does not require equity issuance. If a manager
likes having a high short run stock price even at the expense of long-term value, he may
invest heavily in order to stimulate or cater to optimistic market expectations (Stein
(1996), Polk and Sapienza (2006), Jensen (2005)).
In this paper we test the misvaluation hypothesis using an approach designed to
distinguish rational from misvaluation e®ects, and to probe into the sources of misvalu-
ation e®ects. This approach is to test the relationship between investment and a single
overall measure of misvaluation. A distinctive feature of how we identify misvaluation
as a predictor of investment is that we examine the deviation of market price from a
forward-looking measure of fundamental value.2 Doing so ¯lters from our misvaluation
proxy the contaminating e®ects of prospects for future pro¯t growth. Removing such
contamination is crucial, since, as the q theory of investment implies, current investment
should increase with the quality of investment opportunities; and because ¯rms with bet-
ter management teams optimally should invest more. In this respect our misvaluation
1Several authors provide evidence suggesting that ¯rms time new equity issues to exploit market
misvaluation, or manage earnings to induce such misvaluation|see, e.g., Ritter (1991), Loughran and
Ritter (1995), Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998b, 1998a), Teoh, Wong, and Rao (1998), Baker and Wurgler
(2000), Henderson, Jegadeesh, and Weisbach (2006) and Dong, Hirshleifer, and Teoh (2007). There is
also evidence that overvaluation is associated with greater use of equity as a means of payment in
takeover (Dong et al. (2006)).
2In this respect our approach di®ers from that of Chirinko and Schaller (2001, 2006), who develop
structural models of stock prices under e±cient markets, in order to measure market misvaluation and
its e®ect on corporate investment in Japan and the U.S.
1measure minimizes the confounding of growth prospects and misvaluation e®ects that is
present in many past studies of the stock market and investment.
To do so, we apply the residual income model of Ohlson (1995) to obtain a measure
of fundamental value, sometimes called `intrinsic value' (V ), and measure misvaluation
by V=P, the deviation of market price from this value.3 Intrinsic value re°ects not just
current book value, but a discounted value of analyst forecasts of future earnings. Since
intrinsic value re°ects growth prospects and opportunities, normalizing market price
by intrinsic value ¯lters out the extraneous e®ects of ¯rm growth to provide a puri¯ed
measure of misvaluation.
In contrast, misvaluation measures such as Tobin's q or equity market-to-book rely
for their fundamental benchmarks on a backward looking value measure, book value.
Such valuation ratios therefore re°ect information about the ability of the ¯rm to gen-
erate high returns on its assets. Indeed, many studies have viewed Tobin's q or related
variables as proxies for earnings growth prospects, investment opportunities, or man-
agerial e®ectiveness. So it is hard to distinguish misvaluation from other rational e®ects
based solely on q or market-to-book as misvaluation measures.4 Furthermore, Tobin's
q is a measure of total ¯rm misvaluation (setting aside the confounding with growth
prospects). However, a better measure of the ¯rm's access to underpriced equity capital
is its equity misvaluation.
Training a purer measure of misvaluation upon the misvaluation/investment rela-
tionship is only one of the two main purposes of this paper. The other main purpose
here is to probe the economic sources of these e®ects. We do so in three ways. First, we
test the distinctive predictions of the misvaluation hypothesis for tangible versus intan-
gible investments. Second, we revisit in greater depth the issue of whether the e®ect of
misvaluation on investment operates through equity issuance. Third, we examine how
investment sensitivities to misvaluation vary across size, ¯nancial constraint, turnover,
and valuation subsamples.
With regard to the ¯rst issue, we identify a sharp contrast between the e®ect of mis-
valuation on the creation of intangible assets through R&D investment and the e®ect
3This measure of misvaluation has been applied in a number of studies to the prediction of subsequent
returns (Frankel and Lee (1998), and Lee, Myers, and Swaminathan (1999)), repurchases (D'Mello and
Shro® (2000)), and takeover-related behaviors (Dong et al. (2006)).
4To the extent that our puri¯cation is imperfect, variation in our puri¯ed measure would still re°ect
¯rm growth rather than misvaluation. If this problem were severe we would expect our measure to
have a high absolute correlation with q. In our sample, the correlation with q is not especially strong
(¡0:274). Nevertheless, as a further precaution, we additionally control for growth prospects as proxied
by book-to-market in our tests.
2on the creation of tangible assets through capital expenditures.5 This is an important
topic, since R&D is a source of business innovation, and quantitatively is a major com-
ponent of corporate investment. Indeed, in our sample, beginning in the mid-1990's
R&D constitutes a larger fraction of corporate investment than capital expenditures.
Under the misvaluation hypothesis, measured misvaluation should be most strongly
related to the form of investment that investors are most prone to misvaluing. Intangible
investments such as R&D presumably have relatively uncertain payo®, and therefore
should tend to be relatively hard to value compared to ordinary capital expenditures.6
Intangible investment projects will tend to present managers with greater opportunities
for funding with overvalued equity, and for catering to project misvaluation. Thus, the
misvaluation hypothesis predicts a stronger relation between misvaluation and R&D
expenditures than between misvaluation and capital expenditures.
An integrated examination of equity issuance and investment o®ers insight into
whether the e®ect of misvaluation on investment occurs because managers inherently
seek to boost the stock price (a catering theory, as in Polk and Sapienza (2006)), or
whether overvaluation encourages managers to issue equity (using such funds to invest
more) in order to pro¯t at the expense of new shareholders. Polk and Sapienza (2006)
test between these possibilities by regressing capital expenditures on their misvaluation
test variable, discretionary accruals, and including equity issuance as one of their con-
trols. The e®ect of discretionary accruals survives the inclusion of equity issuance, so
they conclude that there is a catering e®ect of misvaluation on capital expenditures.
However, if high market valuations cause the ¯rm to issue more equity to ¯nance
investment, then equity issuance is an endogenous variable that is in°uenced by misvalu-
ation. Thus, under the misvaluation hypothesis simple regressions tests for misvaluation
e®ects that control for equity issuance are biased. It is therefore important to revisit the
question of whether misvaluation a®ects investment through the equity channel versus
5The primary dependent variable in previous literature on misvaluation is the level of capital expen-
ditures. Polk and Sapienza (2006) use the ¯rm characteristic of high versus low R&D as a conditioning
variable in some of their tests of the relation between misvaluation and capital expenditures. Baker,
Stein, and Wurgler (2003) examine several measures of investment, one of which is the sum of capital
expenditures and R&D, but do not examine whether misvaluation a®ects capital expenditures and R&D
di®erently.
6Psychological evidence suggests that biases such as overcon¯dence will be more severe in activi-
ties (such as long-term research and product development) for which feedback is deferred and highly
uncertain; see, e.g., Einhorn (1980). In the investment model of Panageas (2005), investment is most
a®ected by market valuations when the disagreement about the marginal product of capital is greatest.
Furthermore, there is evidence that greater valuation uncertainty is associated with stronger behavioral
biases in the trades of individual investors (Kumar (2006)).
3catering. We do so using a 2-Stage Least Squares procedure.
We apply such a procedure each year and pool the estimates across time as in Fama
and MacBeth (1973). Empirically, we ¯nd that more positive mispricing is associated
with greater capital expenditures and, very strongly, greater R&D. These ¯ndings remain
after controlling for several other possible determinants of investment, including growth
opportunities (proxied by q or equity book-to-market)7, cash °ow, leverage, and return
volatility. In regression tests, the sensitivity of R&D to misvaluation is about 4-5 times
greater than the sensitivity of capital expenditures.
When we employ simple OLS regressions within our Fama-MacBeth tests, controlling
for equity issuance makes little di®erence for the relation between misvaluation and
capital expenditures, and between misvaluation and R&D. This might seem to imply
that the misvaluation e®ect on investment does not operate through equity issuance.
However, when we address the endogeneity of equity issuance using 2-stage least squares,
the conclusion is quite di®erent; about half of the e®ect of misvaluation on investment
occurs through equity issuance.
Thus, our evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that overvaluation induces ¯rms
to raise cheap equity capital to ¯nance investment, consistent with the models of Stein
(1996) and Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003). At the same time, consistent with the
theory of Jensen (2005) and the model of Polk and Sapienza (2006), misvaluation e®ects
do not operate solely through the equity channel. In other words, our evidence is consis-
tent with misvaluation a®ecting investment for other reasons as well, such as a catering
incentive to boost the short-term stock price.
With regard to the third issue, we probe further into the sources of the misvaluation
e®ect by considering di®erent subsamples which, under di®erent hypotheses, should
a®ect the strength of the misvaluation/investment relation. The sorting variables for
identifying subsamples include measures of ¯nancial constraints, share turnover, ¯rm
size, and the degree of misvaluation.
Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003) ¯nd that the capital expenditures of ¯nancially
constrained ¯rms (where ¯nancial constraint is measured using the index of Kaplan and
Zingales (1997)) are more sensitive to stock price than the capital expenditures of less
constrained ¯rms. Using our puri¯ed measure of misvaluation, equity V=P, we ¯nd
that capital expenditures of ¯nancially constrained ¯rms are more sensitive to market
7Tobin's q and equity book-to-market should be correlated with misvaluation as well as growth.
Controlling for these variables therefore provides conservative tests for misvaluation e®ects. Also, we
employ equity book-to-market rather than market-to-book in our tests for reasons discussed in Section
2.2).
4misvaluation than that of non-constrained ¯rms, consistent with the hypothesis of Baker,
Stein, and Wurgler (2003).8
The ¯ndings for intangible investments are much stronger, and contrast sharply. We
¯nd that the R&D expenditures of ¯nancially constrained ¯rms (high KZ index) are
less sensitive to market misvaluation than that of non-distressed ¯rms. A possible ex-
planation for the contrast between the ¯ndings for capital expenditures and for R&D
is that distressed ¯rms are ill-positioned to take advantage of opportunities to build
intangible assets, both because such assets generate real options which require future
¯nancial °exibility, and because stakeholders such as employees, suppliers, or customers
are reluctant to commit to long-term relationships (Titman (1984)). Indeed, Bhagat
and Welch (1995) ¯nd an inverse relationship between leverage and R&D among U.S.
¯rms. The absence of complementary inputs from stakeholders for such initiatives sug-
gests that among ¯nancially constrained (high-KZ) ¯rms R&D will be less sensitive to
overvaluation than among low-KZ ¯rms.
Polk and Sapienza (2006) propose that the sensitivity of investment to misvaluation
should be higher when managers have a stronger focus on short-run stock prices, because
a short term horizon makes overvalued projects more attractive. Polk and Sapienza use
turnover as a proxy for short-term focus by shareholders. We ¯nd that the sensitivity of
R&D, but not capital expenditures, to misvaluation is higher among high-turnover ¯rms.
This suggests that pressures to maintain short-term valuation are more important for
intangible than for tangible investment. Our ¯nding for capital expenditures contrasts
with Polk and Sapienza's ¯nding (based on a di®erent proxy for misvaluation) of higher
sensitivity among high-turnover ¯rms; see footnote 22.
There are also reasons to expect the e®ects of misvaluation on investment to depend
on ¯rm size. Small ¯rms may be more prone to misvaluation than large ¯rms because of
lower transparency. On the other hand, small ¯rms have less access to equity markets,
potentially limiting their ability to respond to overvaluation by issuing equity to increase
investment. We ¯nd that small ¯rms have higher sensitivity of R&D, but not capital
expenditures, to misvaluation than large ¯rms. The stronger e®ect of R&D suggests
that catering (which is likely to be especially important for intangible investments) is
more important for small ¯rms.
8Baker et al also perform tests using future realized stock returns to proxy for prior misvaluation.
These tests are not their primary focus, presumably because it is challenging to identify an appropriate
benchmark for risk adjustment{the risk of a stock is likely to be correlated with investment, leverage,
and ¯nancial constraints. However, it is encouraging that both contemporaneous and ex post proxies
for misvaluation provide con¯rmation of the Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003) model.
5Finally, when there are ¯xed costs of issuing equity, overvalued ¯rms should be more
likely to issue than undervalued ¯rms. A marginal shift in misvaluation does not change
the scale of equity issuance for a ¯rm that refrains from issuing equity at all. So among
undervalued ¯rms, we expect a relatively small e®ect on issuance and investment of
a reduction in the undervaluation. A similar point holds if projects have a minimum
e±cient scale. In contrast, when overvaluation is su±cient to induce project adoption,
greater overvaluation encourages greater scale of issuance and investment. Alternatively,
managers of overvalued ¯rms may be particularly anxious to undertake overvalued in-
vestments in order to cater to optimistic investor perceptions (Jensen (2005)). These
arguments all imply that misvaluation has a stronger marginal e®ect on investment
among overvalued ¯rms. We test this hypothesis by sorting ¯rms based upon V=P ra-
tios, and examining the relation of investment to valuation within quintiles. Consistent
with the hypothesis, we ¯nd that it is only among overvalued ¯rms that misvaluation
a®ects capital expenditures, R&D, or total investment.
Subsample analysis provides further insight about the importance of catering versus
expropriation through equity issuance as motives for investing. For capital expenditures,
the indirect e®ect of misvaluation through equity issuance is strong only among ¯nan-
cially constrained ¯rms, consistent with the Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003) model.
The direct e®ect (catering) is strong mainly among ¯nancially constrained ¯rms, and
among overvalued ¯rms. The strength of the direct e®ect among overvalued ¯rms is
consistent with the hypothesis that catering incentives (the pressure to maintain a high
stock price) is especially strong among overvalued ¯rms (Jensen (2005)).
For R&D, the indirect e®ect of misvaluation is strongest among ¯rms that are less
¯nancially constrained, and for the kinds of ¯rms (overvalued, high turnover, small)
for which we expect the catering e®ect on intangible investment to be strongest. The
stronger indirect e®ect among such ¯rms suggests that the equity channel tends to
reinforce the e®ect of catering.
A previous literature tests whether market valuations a®ect investment by examining
whether stock prices have incremental predictive power above and beyond proxies for
the quality of growth opportunities such as cash °ow or ¯rm pro¯tability (Barro (1990),
Blanchard, Rhee, and Summers (1993), Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990), and Welch
and Wessels (2000)). Bhagat and Welch (1995) ¯nd a weak link between past returns
and R&D expenditures among U.S. ¯rms. Such tests do not clearly distinguish the q
theory of investment from the misvaluation hypothesis, since, even after controlling for
pro¯ts, stock prices (or past returns) can re°ect investment opportunities.
6More recent papers have used indirect approaches to test for the e®ects of misval-
uation on investment. One approach is to examine whether tight ¯nancial constraints
make investment more sensitive to ¯rm value. Motivated by an extension of the model
of Stein (1996), Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003) ¯nd, consistent with their model, that
the investment of ¯nancially constrained, or `equity-dependent' ¯rms is more sensitive
to stock prices than that of ¯rms that are not ¯nancially constrained.
This evidence is consistent with the idea that misvaluation a®ects investment more
when the only e®ective way to fund investment is to raise new equity capital. However,
Baker et al's misvaluation measure, Tobin's q, is also a measure of prospects for pro¯t
growth. Thus, an alternative interpretation of this evidence that better pro¯t growth
prospects increase investment more among ¯nancially constrained ¯rms.9
Another approach to testing the misvaluation hypothesis is to relate investment to
variables that are expected to correlate with misvaluation, such as discretionary accruals
(Polk and Sapienza (2006)), and dispersion in analyst forecasts of earnings (Gilchrist,
Himmelberg, and Huberman (2005)). These papers provide several ¯ndings consistent
with misvaluation e®ects.10 The intuitions for these variables as misvaluation proxies
are appealing.11 However, such tests are still indirect in the sense that they focus upon
particular hypothesized correlates of misvaluation, rather than trying to measure directly
the overall misvaluation of the ¯rm's equity.12
9Baker, Stein, and Wurgler discuss how strong pro¯t growth prospects can mitigate adverse selection
problems with the funding of investments. Similarly, strong pro¯t growth prospects mitigate debt
overhang problems by increasing the expected payo® to providers of new equity.
10Polk and Sapienza ¯nd that discretionary accruals are positively related to investment and that
this e®ect is stronger among ¯rms with higher R&D intensity (which are presumably harder to value
correctly), and among ¯rms that have high share turnover (a measure of the degree to which current
shareholders have short time horizons). This suggests that managers invest in order to boost the
short-term stock price, a `catering' policy. Polk and Sapienza also ¯nd (see also Titman, Wei, and
Xie (2004)) that capital expenditures negatively predict returns, consistent with high-investment ¯rms
being overvalued. Gilchrist, Himmelberg, and Huberman (2005) ¯nd that greater dispersion in analyst
forecasts of earnings is associated with higher aggregate equity issuance and capital expenditures.
11Discretionary accruals are hypothesized to be related to misvaluation because investors fail to
distinguish between cash °ows and accounting adjustments to earnings. Dispersion of analyst forecasts
is hypothesized to correlate with investment because optimistic investors buy the stock but pessimists
fail to sell short. Some authors, however, have argued that the ability of these variables to predict
returns re°ects rational risk e®ects.
12For example, sometimes investors may be in agreement in overvaluing a ¯rm. Such overvaluation
would not be captured by a dispersion of analyst forecast measure. Similarly, a ¯rm can be misvalued
even when there is no active attempt by managers to manipulate earnings, and misvaluation can vary for
reasons other than variations in current earnings (as a®ected by accruals). These considerations suggest
that it is useful to test the misvaluation hypothesis using a more inclusive measure of misvaluation.
72 Data and Methodology
Our initial data sample includes all U.S. ¯rms listed on NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ
that are covered by CRSP and COMPUSTAT during 1966 to 2005. The residual income
model value to price (V=P) ratio also requires that ¯rms be covered by I/B/E/S for earn-
ings forecasts data, in addition to possessing the necessary accounting items. We further
require each valid ¯rm-year observation to have at least one of capital expenditures and
R&D expenditures non-missing. Consequently, our sample starts from 1977 and ends
2005, including 57,223 ¯rm-year observations. Finally, we exclude ¯nancial ¯rms (¯rms
with one-digit SIC of six). Our main sample (the \full sample") has a total of 53,354
¯rm-year observations between 1977 and 2005.
We examine the relation between ¯rm investment levels (capital expenditures and
R&D expenses) and the (mis)valuation level of the ¯rm's equity (our misvaluation mea-
sures, B=P and V=P, are described below). We relate the ¯rms' investment during
each ¯scal year to the ¯rms' misvaluation measure that is calculated at the beginning
of the ¯scal year. For example, for a ¯rm with December ¯scal year end, we relate the
misvaluation measure calculated at the end of December 2003 to the investment level
for ¯scal year ending in December 2004.
Our sample includes ¯rms with di®erent ¯scal year-ends. To line up ¯rms in calendar
time for the cross-sectional analysis, we use June as the cut-o®. We allow for a four-
month gap from the ¯scal year end for the accounting data to be publicly available.
Under this timing convention, for calendar year t, we include ¯rms with ¯scal year
ends no later than February of year t, and no earlier than March of year t ¡ 1. Note,
therefore, that for the majority of ¯rms, the investment expenditures actually occur one
calendar year prior. For example, for year 2005, the investment expenditures for ¯rms
with December ¯scal year end (the majority of ¯rms) actually occur between January
and December of 2004, and the misvaluation measure is calculated in December 2003.
We compare the investment levels cross-sectionally among sample ¯rms each year, and
aggregate the comparison results across time.
2.1 Investment and Control Variables
We measure ¯rms' investment activities using the following accounting data from COM-
PUSTAT annual ¯les: capital expenditures [Item 128] and Research and Development
expenditures [Item 46]. Our investment variables, CAPX, RD, and TOTINV (CAPX +
8RD), are scaled by previous year total assets [Item 6].13 As in previous studies on in-
vestment and valuation, all variables, include the ones described below, are winsorized
at the 1st and 99th percentile to mitigate the in°uence of outliers. Panel A of Table
1 reports summary statistics of the investment variables. We do not delete a ¯rm-year
observation simply because a certain variable is missing. For example, there are about
60% as many RD observations as CAPX, and we do not delete CAPX for a certain
year simply because RD is missing for that year.
In the multivariate tests, we examine how investment levels depend on valuation
measures, B=P and V=P, controlling for other investment determinants. These control
variables include cash °ow [Item 14 + Item 18 + RD] scaled by lagged assets (missing
RD is set to zero in the cash °ow calculation), and Tobin's q, de¯ned as the market
value of equity plus assets minus the book value of equity [Item 60 + Item 74] all over
assets (see, e.g., Kaplan and Zingales (1997), Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003), and
Polk and Sapienza (2006)). In addition, we include leverage (LEV ) de¯ned as (Item 9
+ Item 34)/(Item 9 + Item 34 + Item 216), equity issuance de¯ned as the change in
book equity minus the change in retained earnings (¢Item 60 + ¢Item 74 ¡¢Item 36)
scaled by lagged assets, following the de¯nition in Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003),
and (to control for ¯rm riskiness) monthly return volatility (SIGMA) estimated over
the previous ¯ve years or at least two years due to missing observations. Except for cash
°ow and equity issuance, which are measured over the ¯scal year, all control variables
are measured at the start of the ¯scal year. Table 1, Panel B presents summary statistics
of these control variables.
2.2 Motivation for and Calculation of Mispricing Proxies
The reliability of the inferences we draw about the misvaluation hypothesis of corporate
investment rests upon the quality of our misvaluation proxies, B=P and primarily V=P.
The validity of our approach, however, does not require that either book value or residual
income value be a better proxy for rational fundamental value than market price. We
merely require that these measures contain substantial incremental information about
fundamentals above and beyond market price. We would expect them to do so if a
signi¯cant portion of variations in market price derives from misvaluation.
13Some studies use net plant, property, and equipment (PP&E) as well as total assets scalings. How-
ever, this paper includes non-manufacturing ¯rms for which intangible assets are especially important,
and compares the e®ects of misvaluation on the creation of intangible assets through R&D with the
e®ect on tangible asset creation through capital expenditures. A scaling that re°ects both kinds of
assets seems most appropriate for this purpose.
9In support of the B=P proxy, an extensive literature ¯nds that ¯rms' B=P ratios are
remarkably strong and robust predictors of the cross-section of subsequent one-month
returns (see, e.g., the review of Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Teoh (2002)). Psychology-
based theoretical models imply that B=P is a proxy for misvaluation, and thereby will
predict subsequent abnormal returns (see, e.g., Barberis and Huang (2001) and Daniel,
Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (2001)). Market values re°ect both mispricing, risk,
and di®erences in true unconditional expected cash °ows (or scale). Book value can
help ¯lter out irrelevant scale di®erences, and so B=P can provide a less noisy measure
of mispricing (see Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (2001)). On the other hand,
B=P is a natural proxy for risk as well. An active debate remains about the extent to
which B=P-based return predictability re°ects a rational risk premium or correction of
mispricing.14
The association of B=P with subsequent abnormal returns suggests that there is a
misvaluation or risk component to the variation of B=P. However, B=P has been used
as a proxy not just for misvaluation or for risk, but also for growth opportunities and for
the degree of information asymmetry (Martin (1996)). Furthermore, proxies for Tobin's
q that are highly correlated with B=P have been employed to measure the quality of
corporate growth opportunities and the degree of managerial discipline. A further source
of noise in B=P for our purposes is that book value, the numerator of B=P, is in°uenced
by ¯rm and industry di®erences in accounting methods.
We calculate B=P as a ratio of equity rather than total asset values, because it is
equity rather than total misvaluation that is likely to matter for corporate investment
decisions; a similar point applies for V=P. This would be the case, for example, for a ¯rm
with overvalued stock to raise equity rather than debt capital to ¯nance an investment
project.
There is also strong support for V=P as an indicator of mispricing. Lee, Myers,
and Swaminathan (1999) ¯nd that aggregate residual income values predict one-month-
ahead returns on the Dow 30 stocks better than aggregate B=P. Frankel and Lee (1998)
¯nd that V is a better predictor than book value of the cross-section of contempora-
neous stock prices, and that V=P is a predictor of the one-year-ahead cross-section of
returns. Furthermore, Ali, Hwang, and Trombley (2003) report that the abnormal re-
turns associated with high V=P are partially concentrated around subsequent earnings
14See, e.g., Fama and French (1996) and Daniel and Titman (1997), and the review of Daniel, Hirsh-
leifer, and Teoh (2002). Some more recent empirical papers addressing factor risk versus mispricing as
explanations for the B=P premium include Gri±n and Lemmon (2002), Cohen, Polk, and Vuolteenaho
(2003) and Vassalou and Xing (2004).
10announcements. They also report that after controlling for a large set of possible risk
factors (including beta, size, book/market, residual risk, and loadings from the Fama and
French (1996) three-factor model), V=P continues to predict future returns signi¯cantly.
These ¯ndings make V=P an attractive index of mispricing.15
There are other possible indices of misvaluation. An alternative measure which we
do not examine is the earnings/price ratio. Earnings price ratios have several drawbacks
for our purposes. First, earnings/price is not as strong a predictor of month-ahead
stock returns as book/market (see, e.g., Fama and French (1996)), suggesting that it
is a less accurate measure of mispricing. Second, short-term earnings °uctuations will
tend to shift earnings/price even if the degree of misvaluation is unchanged. Third, and
relatedly, negative earnings are more common than negative book values, leading more
frequently to negative values of earnings/price.
The residual income value has at least two important advantages over book value as
a fundamental measure. First, it is designed to be invariant to accounting treatments
(to the extent that the `clean surplus' accounting identity obtains; see Ohlson (1995)),
making V=P less sensitive to such choices. Second, in addition to the backward-looking
information contained in book value, it also re°ects analyst forecasts of future earnings.
Of course, it is possible that in the process of ¯ltering out extraneous information,
some genuine information about mispricing is also ¯ltered out from V=P. In our sample,
the correlation of B=P with V=P is fairly low, 0.185. Thus, V=P potentially o®ers useful
independent information beyond B=P regarding misvaluation. This is to be expected,
as much of the variation in book/market arises from di®erences in growth prospects or
in managerial discipline that do not necessarily correspond to misvaluation.
Turning to procedure, we calculate the B=P proxy as the ratio of book value of
equity to market value of equity. Each month for each stock, book equity (Item 60) is
measured at the end of the prior ¯scal year.16 Market value of equity is measured at the
end of the month.
Our estimation procedure for V=P is similar to that of Lee, Myers, and Swaminathan
(1999). For each stock in month t, we estimate the residual income model (RIM) price,
denoted by V (t). With the assumption of \clean surplus" accounting, which states that
15For example, D'Mello and Shro® (2000) apply V=P to measure mispricing of equity repurchasers.
As in Dong et al. (2006), our focus is on measuring market pricing errors relative to publicly available
information. We therefore calculate our misvaluation proxies solely using contemporaneous information
(current price, book value, and analyst forecasts).
16Using the de¯nition as in Baker and Wurgler (2002) for book equity value does not change our
results materially but reduces our sample size.
11the change in book value of equity equals earnings minus dividends, the intrinsic value
of ¯rm stock can be written as the book value plus the discounted value of an in¯nite
sum of expected residual incomes (see Ohlson (1995)),
V (t) = B(t) +
1 X
i=1
Et[fROE(t + i) ¡ re(t)g B(t + i ¡ 1)]
[1 + re(t)]i ;
where Et is the expectations operator, B(t) is the book value of equity at time t (negative
B(t) observations are deleted), ROE(t + i) is the return on equity for period t + i, and
re(t) is the ¯rm's annualized cost of equity capital.
For practical purposes, the above in¯nite sum needs to be replaced by a ¯nite series
of T ¡1 periods, plus an estimate of the terminal value beyond period T. This terminal
value is estimated by viewing the period T residual income as a perpetuity. Lee, Myers,
and Swaminathan (1999) report that the quality of their V (t) estimates was not sensitive
to the choice of the forecast horizon beyond three years. The residual income valuations
are also likely to be less sensitive to errors in terminal value estimates than in a dividend
discounting model; pre-terminal values include book value, so that terminal values are
based on residual earnings rather than full earnings (or dividends).17 Of course, the
residual income V (t) cannot perfectly capture growth, so our misvaluation proxy V=P
does not perfectly ¯lter out growth e®ects. However, since V re°ects forward-looking
earnings forecasts, a large portion of the growth e®ects contained in B=P should be
¯ltered out of V=P.
We use a three-period forecast horizon:
V (t) = B(t) +
[fROE(t + 1) ¡ re(t)]B(t)
1 + re(t)
+
[fROE(t + 2) ¡ re(t)]B(t + 1)
[1 + re(t)]2
+
[fROE(t + 3) ¡ re(t)]B(t + 2)
[1 + re(t)]2 re(t)
; (1)
where fROE(t + i) is the forecasted return on equity for period t + i, the length of a
period is one year, and where the last term discounts the period t + 3 residual income
as a perpetuity.18
17For example, D'Mello and Shro® (2000) found that in their sample of repurchasing ¯rms, ¯rms'
terminal value was on average 11% of their total residual income value, whereas using a dividend
discount model the terminal value was 58% of total value.
18Following Lee, Myers, and Swaminathan (1999) and D'Mello and Shro® (2000), in calculating the
terminal value component of V we assume that expected residual earnings remain constant after year
3, so that the discount rate for the perpetuity is the ¯rm's cost of equity capital.
12Forecasted ROE's are computed as
f
ROE(t + i) =
fEPS(t + i)
¹ B(t + i ¡ 1)
; where ¹ B(t + i ¡ 1) ´
B(t + i ¡ 1) + B(t + i ¡ 2)
2
;
and where fEPS(t+i) is the forecasted EPS for period t+i.19 We require that each of
these fROE's be less than 1.
Future book values of equity are computed as
B(t + i) = B(t + i ¡ 1) + (1 ¡ k)f
EPS(t + i);





and D(t) and EPS(t) are respectively the dividend and EPS for period t. Following Lee,
Myers, and Swaminathan (1999), if k < 0 (owing to negative EPS), we divide dividends
by (0.06 £ total assets) to derive an estimate of the payout ratio, i.e., we assume that
earnings are on average 6% of total assets. Observations in which the computed k is
greater than 1 are deleted from the study.
The annualized cost of equity, re(t), is determined as a ¯rm-speci¯c rate using the
CAPM, where the time-t beta is estimated using the trailing ¯ve years (or, if there is
not enough data, at least two years) of monthly return data. The market risk premium
assumed in the CAPM is the average annual premium over the riskfree rate for the
CRSP value-weighted index over the preceding 30 years. Any estimate of the CAPM
cost of capital that is outside the range of 3%-30% (less than 1% of our estimates) is
winsorized to lie at the border of the range. Previous studies have reported that the
predictive ability of V=P was robust to the cost of capital model used (Lee, Myers, and
Swaminathan (1999)) and to whether the discount rate was allowed to vary across ¯rms
(D'Mello and Shro® (2000)). We checked the robustness of our main ¯ndings using the
alternative constant discount rate of 12.5% (following D'Mello and Shro® (2000)). The
results were similar to those reported here.
The benchmark for fair valuation is not equal to 1 for either ratio, for two reasons.
First, book is an historical value that does not re°ect growth. Second, residual income
19If the EPS forecast for any horizon is not available, it is substituted by the EPS forecast for the
previous horizon and compounded at the long-term growth rate (as provided by I/B/E/S). If the long-
term growth rate is not available from I/B/E/S, the EPS forecast for the ¯rst preceding available
horizon is used as a surrogate for fEPS(t + i).
13model valuations have been found to be too low on average. Thus, our tests consider
relative comparisons these misvaluation proxies: higher (lower) values of B=P or V=P
indicate relative undervaluation (overvaluation).
Panel C of Table 1 reports summary statistics the two valuation ratios. We retain
negative V values caused by low earnings forecasts, because such cases should also be
informative about overvaluation. We use V=P as a measure of undervaluation (rather
than P=V as a measure of overvaluation), because negative values of P=V should indicate
over- rather than under- valuation. For consistency we also use B=P rather than P=B.
Removing negative V=P observations (about 5% of the sample) tends to reduce statistical
signi¯cance levels in our tests without materially altering the results.
2.3 Conditioning Variables
Previous research has documented that proxies for the degree of ¯nancial constraints and
the degree of investor short-termism a®ect the relationship between misvaluation and
capital expenditures. As discussed in the introduction, there is theoretical motivation
for such tests. Here we o®er tests for these e®ects using an overall contemporaneous
measure of misvaluation, V=P, that is puri¯ed of growth e®ects. The ¯rst conditioning
variables we examine is the KZ index, as de¯ned in Kaplan and Zingales (1997), a
measure of ¯nancial constraints. Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003) show that corporate
investment should be more sensitive to stock valuation level in ¯nancially constrained
¯rms (high KZ index). Following Lamont, Polk, and Saa-Requejo (2001) and Baker,
Stein, and Wurgler (2003), the original KZ index for year t is de¯ned as
KZt(five variable) = ¡1:002CFt ¡ 39:368DIVt ¡ 1:315Ct + 3:139LEVt + 0:283qt;
where CFt is cash °ow scaled by lagged total assets; DIVt is cash dividends (Item 21 +
Item 19) scaled by lagged assets; Ct is cash balances (Item 1) scaled by lagged assets;
LEVt is leverage ((Item 9 + Item 34)/(Item 9 +Item 34 + Item 216)), and qt is Tobin's
q as de¯ned earlier.
Since q contains market price, it should be correlated with market misvaluation, and
has been used as a misvaluation proxy in past literature. To avoid using a conditioning
variable for ¯nancial constraint that contains the misvaluation e®ects we are testing for,
following Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003) we construct a four-variable version of the
KZ index (excluding q) for year t:
KZt = ¡1:002CFt ¡ 39:368DIVt ¡ 1:315Ct + 3:139LEVt:
14Second, Polk and Sapienza (2006) examine a catering theory that the investment
sensitivity to misvaluation will be higher when there is a higher fraction of short-term
investors. They document that the sensitivity of capital expenditures to misvaluation is
higher for stocks with high share turnover (here, measured as monthly trading volume
as a percentage of total number of shares outstanding).20
Third, ¯rm size, as measured by total assets, is a natural conditioning variable re-
lating to multiple e®ects. Small ¯rms may be more prone to market misvaluation than
large ¯rms because of greater uncertainty and information asymmetry between investors
and insiders, and lower liquidity. Small ¯rms also tend to have less access to external
capital.
Panel D of Table 1 reports summary statistics of the conditioning variables that
potentially in°uence valuation-sensitivity. These three variables are not highly correlated
with each other, with the highest correlation being only 0.052 (between the KZ index
and total assets). In the tests to follow, we examine how market valuations a®ect capital
expenditures and R&D investment in the full sample, as well as in subsamples formed
based upon these variables.
2.4 Time Patterns in Investment and Valuations
Table 2 reports yearly descriptive information for our sample during 1977-2005. Capital
expenditures are relatively stable over time, but there is a marked decrease after 2001,
suggesting that companies generally cut capital spending after the burst of the stock
market bubble. This decrease in CAPX is coupled with a drastic drop in cash °ow in
2002. R&D activities, on the other hand, have wider variations but generally increase
over time, and decline slightly after 2001. As mentioned in the introduction, after 1994,
RD overtakes CAPX as the larger component of corporate investment, growing much
larger toward the end of the sample period. These facts emphasize the importance of
examining RD in addition to CAPX.
Table 2 also shows that overall, V=P is higher than B=P, suggesting, as expected,
that residual earnings add value to stocks on average. The V=P mean (median) of 0.733
(0.628) is substantially greater than the B=P mean (median) of 0.669 (0.515). V=P has
a higher mean than B=P each year after 1993, except for the year 2002; V=P has a
20It has been suggested that the trading volumes in NASDAQ and NYSE/AMEX may not be directly
comparable. Our conclusions with respect to share turnover are qualitatively unchanged when, following
LaPlante and Muscarella (1997), we divide the NASDAQ trading volume by a factor of 2, or when we
separate the NASDAQ and NYSE/AMEX listed ¯rms in the tests.
15higher median value each year after 1986.
3 How Misvaluation A®ects Investment: Univariate
Tests
This section provides univariate tests of the e®ect of misvaluation on tangible and intan-
gible corporate investment. Each year, ¯rms are grouped into quintile portfolios accord-
ing to either B=P or V=P of the month preceding each ¯scal year start. The valuation
portfolios are formed annually to ensure that any e®ects we identify are cross-sectional,
and therefore not driven by time-series swings in market valuation and investment ac-
tivities. Each year mean investment levels are computed for each quintile. Finally,
time-series mean of the investment levels for each quintile is computed.
Table 3 reports how under- or over- valuation is related to the capital expenditures
and R&D activities. Mean values of B=P or V=P, and the investment variables CAPX,
RD, the sum of the two investments (TOTINV ), and their di®erences between top and
bottom valuation ¯rms are reported.
3.1 Full Sample Tests
We begin by examining the relation of investment to misvaluation in the full sample.
Table 3 reports the relation of investment measures to B=P and V=P quintiles. It is
evident that high-valuation ¯rms (as measured by either B=P or V=P) invest more
in both capital spending and R&D. Investment levels (CAPX, RD, and TOTINV )
all increase monotonically with valuations; the most overvalued quintile measured by
B=P (V=P) invests 11.51% (10.58%) more in total investment (capital expenditures
and R&D) than the most undervalued quintile. All these quintile di®erences are highly
statistically signi¯cant, with t-statistics all exceeding 4.64. The B=P evidence could
re°ect either misvaluation, or (under the rational q theory) that ¯rms with strong growth
opportunities invest more. The results using our puri¯ed misvaluation measure (V=P)
strongly con¯rm that misvaluation a®ects corporate investment.
Furthermore, the evidence strongly supports the further implication of the misval-
uation hypothesis, that intangible investment is more sensitive to misvaluation than
tangible investment. RD is more sensitive to misvaluation as measured by V=P than
CAPX. The most overvalued V=P quintile invests 8.30% more in RD, but only 2.12%
more in CAPX, than the most undervalued quintile. In the full sample, the misvalu-
16ation sensitivity ratio (the ratio of interquintile spread of investment to the spread in
valuation) for RD is 5.32, whereas the misvaluation sensitivity ratio for CAPX is only
2.12.
These ¯ndings highlight two immediate insights from tests using the puri¯ed V=P
misvaluation measure as compared with B=P. First, R&D is much more sensitive to
measured misvaluation than is evident using B=P. In the full sample, the di®erence in
RD between the most over- and undervalued quintiles using V=P, is 8.30%, is larger
than the 5.54% using B=P, and the misvaluation sensitivity ratio for RD using V=P of
5.32, exceeds that of B=P, 4.25.
Second, capital spending as measured by CAPX is much less sensitive to measured
misvaluation than is evident using B=P. The di®erence in CAPX between the most over-
and undervalued quintiles of 2.12% using V=P is much less than the 6.18% di®erence
using B=P. Thus, the misvaluation sensitivity ratio for CAPX using V=P of 2.12 is far
lower than the CAPX sensitivity ratio of 4.53 for B=P.
Thus, V=P provides a sharply di®erent conclusion about the relative sensitivity to
misvaluation of tangible versus intangible investments. Using B=P one would conclude
that tangible investment, CAPX, has slightly higher sensitivity to misvaluation than
does intangible investment, measure RD (4:53 > 4:25). However, this conclusion seems
to come from the fact that B=P contains information about growth prospects, rather
than from misvaluation e®ects. Using V=P, intangible investment is far more sensitive
to misvaluation (RD sensitivity to V=P is 5.32 than is tangible investment (CAPX
sensitivity to V=P is only 2.12).
As discussed in Section 2.2, V=P is a purer measure of misvaluation than B=P,
because B=P re°ects earnings growth prospects. So a natural explanation for the dif-
ference between the B=P and V=P ¯ndings is that growth has an e®ect opposing the
misvaluation e®ect. For example, ¯rms whose earnings are currently growing rapidly (as
re°ected in low B=P) are likely to have stronger prospects for growth through expansion
of current assets, and hence are more likely to scale up current assets through heavier
tangible investment.
3.2 Conditions A®ecting the Sensitivity of Investment to Mis-
valuation
We now examine subsamples to test di®erent possible reasons why misvaluation a®ects
investment. Previous research has suggested that misvaluation should a®ect investment
17more among ¯rms that are ¯nancially constrained (Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003)),
and that the e®ect of misvaluation on investment should be stronger when investors have
shorter time horizons (Polk and Sapienza (2006)). We form subsamples based upon the
Kaplan and Zingales index, and based upon turnover, to test these theories. These
tests di®er from those in Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003) in our use of a misvaluation
measure that focuses on equity rather than total ¯rm misvaluation, and which is puri¯ed
of earnings growth e®ects. Our tests di®er from those in Polk and Sapienza (2006)
in using an overall misvaluation measure (i.e., a deviation of price from a measure of
fundamental value), rather than proxies for particular sources of misvaluation, such as
the level of accruals.
Furthermore, our tests di®er from previous literature in examining separately the
e®ects of misvaluation on tangible versus intangible investment, and in considering con-
ditionings based upon misvaluation categories. We will see that these di®erences o®er
further insights about why some ¯rms may ¯nd it hard to take advantage of equity
overvaluation.
Finally, we investigate whether there are systematic di®erences in the misvaluation
e®ects on investment between large and small ¯rms. We form size portfolios based upon
total assets.
3.2.1 How Financial Constraints A®ect the Sensitivity of Investment to
Misvaluation
We ¯rst test the e®ects of misvaluation on investment among ¯rms that are more versus
less ¯nancially constrained, as measured by high versus low levels of the KZ index. Ac-
cording to the theory of Stein (1996) as extended by Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003),
¯nancially constrained ¯rms should be more equity-dependent, and therefore possess
high investment sensitivity to market valuation. This theory is con¯rmed in Baker,
Stein, and Wurgler (2003) using q as a valuation measure and the KZ index as a mea-
sure of ¯nancial distress. Table 4 presents our univariate ¯ndings, where high ¯nancial
constraints are identi¯ed as ¯rms with above-median KZ index, and low constraints with
below-median KZ index.
For B=P, the univariate evidence fails to support a di®erence in misvaluation sen-
sitivities between sets of ¯rms with di®erent ¯nancial constraints. For CAPX, the
inter-quintile B=P spread is ¡1:61 among high KZ index ¯rms, and only ¡1:09 among
low KZ-index ¯rms. In the high-KZ subsample (Panel A), the most highly valued ¯rms
invest 7.61% more in capital expenditures than the lowest valuation ¯rms; the ratio of
18this di®erence in capital expenditures to the di®erence in B=P is 4.72. In the low-KZ
subsample (Panel B), the most highly valued ¯rms invest 4.69% more in capital expendi-
tures than the lowest valuation ¯rms; the ratio of this di®erence in capital expenditures
to the di®erence in B=P is 4.47. The two investment sensitivities (4.72 and 4.47) are
therefore only minimally di®erent, and Panel C indicates no signi¯cant di®erence in
these sensitivities.
For RD, the inter-quintile di®erence in RD is identical among high-KZ and low-
KZ ¯rms (4.65%). Since the B=P spread is smaller among low-KZ ¯rms, this means
that investment is more sensitive to B=P among the low-KZ, ¯nancially unconstrained
¯rms. Speci¯cally, the sensitivity ratio among high-KZ ¯rms is only 3.12, whereas the
sensitivity ratio among low-KZ ¯rms is a far larger 4.52. Panel C indicates that this
di®erence in sensitivities is highly signi¯cant (t = ¡3:70).
For TOTINV , the sum of CAPX and RD, the di®erence between the top and bottom
valuation ¯rms is higher among the high-KZ ¯rms (11.40%) than among low-KZ ¯rms
(9.46%). However, since the B=P valuation spread is smaller among the low-KZ ¯rms,
the sensitivity of TOTINV to B=P, 9.14, is actually greater than the sensitivity among
the high-KZ ¯rms, 7.28. Panel C indicates that this di®erence is signi¯cant (t = ¡3:61).
Overall, the B=P evidence is not consistent with the theory.
However, B=P mixes misvaluation e®ects with growth e®ects, whereas the theory of
Baker, Stein, and Wurgler is focused on the sensitivity of investment to misvaluation.
Indeed, when valuations are measured by V=P, the ¯ndings for capital expenditures
are quite di®erent. We ¯nd reasonably supportive evidence for the model prediction
for CAPX{ more ¯nancially constrained ¯rms seem to have higher sensitivities to mis-
valuation. Interestingly, for RD and for total investment (TOTINV ), the pattern is
reversed|more ¯nancially constrained ¯rms have lower sensitivities of RD to misvalu-
ation.
In Panel A, for the high-KZ subsample, the most overvalued ¯rms (based on V=P)
have substantially higher CAPX, 2.53%, than the most undervalued ¯rms. This di®er-
ence corresponds to a misvaluation sensitivity ratio for CAPX of 2.25. In Panel B, the
corresponding quintile di®erence in CAPX for low-KZ ¯rms is only 1.39%, though this
di®erence is still highly statistically signi¯cant (t = 3:16). This di®erence corresponds
to a misvaluation sensitivity ratio of 1.74. This point estimate is indeed lower than the
estimated sensitivity for the high-KZ subsample, although Panel C indicates that the
di®erence is only marginally signi¯cant (t = 1:89).
In contrast, the V=P evidence for R&D shows a much lower RD sensitivity to mis-
19valuation among high than among low-KZ ¯rms. In the high-KZ subsample (Panel A),
the most overvalued quintile invests 5.05% more in R&D than the most undervalued
quintile, which corresponds to a misvaluation sensitivity ratio of 3.25. For the low-KZ
Subsample (Panel B), the most overvalued quintile invests 8.87% more in R&D than the
most undervalued quintile, which corresponds to a far larger misvaluation sensitivity
ratio of 6.35. Panel C indicates that the di®erence in sensitivities is highly signi¯cant
(t = ¡7:80).
Furthermore, high-KZ ¯rms also have lower sensitivity of overall investment (TOTINV )
to V=P than do low-KZ ¯rms. For instance, in the high-KZ subsample, overvalued ¯rms
invest 7.59% more than undervalued ¯rms, for a misvaluation sensitivity ratio of 5.52.
The corresponding TOTINV di®erence among the low-KZ subsample is 10.62%, for a
much higher misvaluation sensitivity of 8.32. Panel C indicates that the di®erence in
sensitivities is highly signi¯cant (t = ¡5:16).
In summary, using our preferred measure of misvaluation (V=P), the univariate ev-
idence provides support for the Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003) ¯nancial constraints
theory as applied to tangible investments (capital expenditures); but for intangible in-
vestment (R&D), investment sensitivity is much stronger for ¯rms that are ¯nancially
unconstrained. Why are ¯ndings for intangible investments so strong and so di®erent
from the results for tangible investments? A possible explanation is that ¯nancial dis-
tress a®ects di®erently a ¯rm's ability to exploit misvaluation through tangible versus
intangible investment. Distress may interfere with the creation of intangible assets,
since customers, employees and suppliers may be reluctant to commit to ¯rm-speci¯c
investments, such as the time and e®ort required to build relationships with the ¯rm
(see, e.g., Titman (1984)). In other words, the ¯rm may face reluctance on the part of
parties, either within or outside the ¯rm, whose inputs would be complementary with
intangible investments by the ¯rm. As a distressed ¯rm becomes more overvalued (or
less undervalued), it may not be able to usefully increase its investment in intangibles
as easily as it can increase its investment in tangible assets.
3.2.2 How Investor Time Horizons A®ect the Sensitivity of Investment to
Misvaluation
Table 5 shows the univariate relationship between investment and valuation for subsam-
ples sorted by share turnover. Polk and Sapienza (2006) hypothesize that high-turnover
¯rms should have higher investment-valuation sensitivity because these ¯rms have short-
term investors. They also provide empirical support for this prediction using accruals
20as an indicator of misvaluation. Table 5 shows that this prediction is con¯rmed in the
univariate test using an overall measure of misvaluation, V=P.
We begin with the ¯ndings for B=P, recognizing that this could re°ect either misval-
uation or growth e®ects. All three investment measures { CAPX, RD, and TOTINV ,
show a higher sensitivity to B=P in the high-turnover subsample than in the low-turnover
subsample. For example, in the high-turnover subsample, the most highly valued quin-
tile based on B=P invests 7.03% more in capital expenditures than the lowest value
quintile, implying a valuation sensitivity of 5.21; the corresponding di®erence is 4.35%
for the low-turnover subsample, for a valuation sensitivity of only 3.24. A similar point
holds for R&D.
Using V=P, the most overvalued quintile invests 2.02% more in capital expenditures
than the most undervalued quintile for a valuation sensitivity of 2.25; the correspond-
ing di®erence is only 1.02% for the low-turnover subsample, for a valuation sensitivity
of only 1.03. As in the full sample, R&D is more sensitive to valuation than capital
expenditures. Furthermore, the di®erence in R&D sensitivity between the high- and
low-turnover subsamples is greater than the di®erence in capital expenditures sensitiv-
ity.
3.2.3 How Firm Size A®ects the Sensitivity of Investment to Misvaluation
Table 6 reports the univariate investment-valuation relations for subsamples sorted by
total assets. When valuation is measured by B=P, small ¯rms appear to have higher
sensitivity of CAPX to valuation than do large ¯rms. The valuation sensitivity ratio
of 5.13 for small ¯rms is signi¯cantly higher than the sensitivity ratio of 3.87 for large
¯rms (t = 4:31). However, using the puri¯ed measure V=P, the misvaluation sensitivity
ratio for large ¯rms is higher than that for small ¯rms, though the di®erence, 0.36, is
not signi¯cant (t = 0:91). This ¯nding indicates that the di®erence in sensitivity of
CAPX to B=P between large and small ¯rms derives from growth opportunities rather
than misvaluation, i.e., that small ¯rms have a higher sensitivity of CAPX to growth
opportunities than do large ¯rms.
In contrast, small ¯rms have higher sensitivity of R&D to misvaluation than large
¯rms, sorting misvaluation by either B=P or V=P. Using B=P, the sensitivity of small
¯rm RD to misvaluation is 1.99 higher than the sensitivity of large ¯rms (t = 4:31); using
V=P, this di®erence in valuation sensitivity between small and large ¯rms is even higher
(3.00; t = 10:28). In particular, among small ¯rms, the most overvalued ¯rms according
to V=P invest 14.82% in R&D, more than triple the R&D of the most undervalued ¯rms
21(4.66%).
One of the possible reasons for a di®erence between large and small ¯rms is that small
¯rms have less access to equity capital. We therefore defer discussion of the explanation
for the di®erence in ¯ndings for small versus large ¯rms until Section 4, where we perform
multivariate tests which decompose the e®ects of misvaluation into a direct e®ect and
an e®ect that operates through equity issuance.
4 Multivariate Tests
Both to test the robustness of the investment-valuation relations documented in the
previous section, and to evaluate whether misvaluation e®ects on investment operate
through equity issuance, we perform multivariate analysis with additional controls, and
tests that measure the strength of the equity issuance channel. The controls we use
include Tobin's q, cash °ow scaled by lagged assets, leverage, equity issuance scaled by
lagged assets, return volatility, and 2-digit SIC major industry dummies as de¯ned by
Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999).
Polk and Sapienza (2006) point out that in general equity issuance constitutes a
relatively low fraction of the capital available to ¯rms for capital investment. This
provides a useful perspective on the ¯nding that much of the misvaluation e®ect on
investment does not operate through equity issuance. Nevertheless, the misvaluation
hypothesis in general suggests that overvaluation should increase equity issuance and
investment (Stein (1996), Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003), Gilchrist, Himmelberg,
and Huberman (2005)), and as discussed in the introduction, there is evidence that
equity issuance is associated with overvaluation. These past ¯ndings suggest that it is
interesting to test whether misvaluation in°uences investment through the issuance of
overvalued equity.
We perform Fama-MacBeth style regressions cross-sectionally each year, so that
the B=P and V=P measures, as well as the investment variables, are compared cross-
sectionally, in order to eliminate possible spurious e®ects arising from time-series swings
in these variables. Table 7 reports the time-series weighted averages and t-statistics of
the coe±cients of the regressions for the full sample, where the weight is the number of
¯rms in each yearly regression. The dependent variables are CAPX, RD, and TOTINV .
We report four regression speci¯cations for each dependent variable. (1) We regress
on B=P. (2) We regress on V=P. (3) We include both B=P and V=P (dropping q since
q and B=P capture similar information) to examine whether there is incremental ex-
22planatory power from V=P as a misvaluation measure given B=P. If so, this provides a
fairly stringent con¯rmation that the identi¯ed e®ect is a result of misvaluation, rather
than the earnings growth fundamentals that are correlated with book/market. We draw
our main inference from speci¯cation (3) which is more stringent as a test of the misval-
uation hypothesis. (4) We add equity issuance as a further regressor to speci¯cation (3).
We discuss model (4) primarily in Section 4.1.1 where we address equity ¯nancing as
a channel through which misvaluation may a®ect corporate investment. There we also
address the endogeneity of equity issuance using 2-stage least squares regressions.
4.1 Full Sample Tests
Table 7 presents regression results for the full sample. The coe±cient of ¡0:479 (t =
¡3:40) on V=P in speci¯cation (2) indicates that V=P has a signi¯cant negative relation
to CAPX for the full sample|undervalued ¯rms invest less. B=P is highly signi¯cant, so
as a conservative test we additionally control for B=P in speci¯cations (3) and (4). V=P
remains signi¯cant both in regression (3), which omits equity issuance, and regression
(4), which includes it.
The e®ect of misvaluation on R&D is impressive. The coe±cient on V=P is highly
signi¯cant in all speci¯cations. In regression (3), which controls for B=P, V=P has a
coe±cient of ¡1:999 (t = ¡7:89). The coe±cients on V=P in the R&D regressions are
roughly 4 times greater than the coe±cients in the CAPX regressions. This is consistent
with the univariate tests (Table 3) which show that RD has a much higher sensitivity
to V=P than does CAPX. Finally, TOTINV (the sum of CAPX and RD) is also
highly sensitive to V=P; the V=P coe±cient in the TOTINV speci¯cation (3) is ¡2:453
(t = ¡8:36).
A comparison of models (3) and (4) for each of the dependent variables shows that
the coe±cient on V=P decreases only modestly when the equity issuance variable EI is
included. This is similar to the ¯ndings of Polk and Sapienza (2006) for CAPX using
discretionary accruals as a misvaluation proxy, and might seem to suggest that the equity
channel explains little of the misvaluation e®ect. However, since equity issuance should
be endogenously related to misvaluation, we later perform 2-stage least squares tests to
address the e®ects of equity issuance.
To gauge the economic importance of the investment-valuation relation, we examine
the e®ect of a one-standard-deviation shift in V=P on investment levels; and compare
this to the e®ect of a comparable shift in cash °ow. Table 1 shows that the standard
23deviations of V=P and cash °ow are 0.672 and 13.65%, respectively (where cash °ow is
expressed as a percent of total assets). According to the TOTINV regression speci¯ca-
tion (3), a one-standard-deviation shift in V=P therefore implies a 1.65% (2:453£0:672)
change in TOTINV (where investment is expressed as a percent of total assets.) This
compares with a 4.16% (0:305£13:65) change in the investment ratio by a one-standard-
deviation shift in cash °ow, implying that the e®ect of valuation on corporate investment
is about 40% of the e®ect of cash °ow.
The sensitivities of RD to misvaluation and to cash °ow are much closer. The
corresponding sensitivities are 1.34% and 2.03% for one-standard-deviation shifts in
V=P and cash °ow, respectively.
4.1.1 The Equity Channel
There are theoretical arguments for why misvaluation should a®ect investment, either
through equity issuance or directly for purposes of in°uencing the the current stock price
(Stein (1996), Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003), Gilchrist, Himmelberg, and Huberman
(2005), Jensen (2005), and Polk and Sapienza (2006)). Both theory and past evidence
also suggest that equity issuance is endogenously related both to misvaluation and to
our controls. To measure the extent to which the e®ect of misvaluation on investment
operates through the equity channel, we therefore perform 2-stage least squares (2SLS)
regressions.
Each year, 2SLS cross-sectional regressions are performed for model (4) in Table
7, with equity issuance (EI) being an endogenous variable. Speci¯cally, the system of
equations is as follows:
EI = a1 + b1V=P + c1B=P + d1CF + e1LEV + f1SIGMA + u1
S = a2 + b2V=P + c2B=P + d2CF + e2LEV + f2SIGMA + g2c EI + u2;
where S is one of the investment variables CAPX;RD, or TOTINV . The ¯rst-stage EI
regression includes 2-digit SIC major industry dummies in addition to the exogenous
variables (V=P, B=P, CF, LEV , and SIGMA) in the independent variables. In the
second-stage investment regression, the endogenous variable c EI is the predicted value
of equity issuance from the ¯rst-stage regression.
Based on this structure, the coe±cient of V=P in the second-stage S regression,
b2, re°ects the direct e®ect of misvaluation on investment, because this is the e®ect of
V=P after controlling for the e®ect of equity issuance. The indirect e®ect of V=P on
investment through equity issuance is measured by b1£g2, the product of the coe±cient
24of V=P in the ¯rst-stage EI regression and the coe±cient of c EI in the second-stage
S regression. Finally, the sum of direct and indirect e®ects, b2 + b1g2, measures the
full e®ect of V=P on investment. It is also the V=P coe±cient in the reduced form S
regression. We calculate the time-series weighted averages and t-statistics of the direct,
indirect, and full e®ects of V=P on investment, where the weight is the number of ¯rms
in each yearly regression.
The ¯rst bank of regressions in Table 8 shows the e®ect of misvaluation on capital
expenditures through di®erent channels. The equity issuance equation con¯rms evidence
from previous studies (Loughran and Ritter (1995), Baker and Wurgler (2000), Baker,
Stein, and Wurgler (2003), and Dong, Hirshleifer, and Teoh (2007)) suggesting that
overvaluation is associated with greater equity issuance. The coe±cient on V=P in the
second regression shows that the direct e®ect of V=P on CAPX is small and insigni¯cant.
However, the coe±cient of 0.165 (t = 2:42) on c EI indicates that the indirect e®ect of
V=P on CAPX through equity issuance is signi¯cant.
Nevertheless, in the reduced form equation for CAPX, the coe±cient indicating the
total e®ect of V=P on CAPX, ¡0:258 (t = ¡1:43) is insigni¯cant. The subsample
analysis below will show that there is a signi¯cant total e®ect of V=P on CAPX among
the most ¯nancially constrained ¯rms, and among the most overvalued ¯rms.
Overall, the ¯ndings for capital expenditures provide a degree of evidence that mis-
valuation a®ects capital expenditures through the equity channel, but little indication of
a direct e®ect. However, we will later see that there are subsamples in which the direct
catering e®ect is stronger than the equity channel e®ect.
The second bank of regressions show the e®ect of misvaluation on R&D occurring
both through and independently of equity issuance. Again the equity issuance equation
con¯rms that overvaluation increases equity issuance (the numbers are slightly di®erent
because of di®erent data requirements for the R&D regression). In contrast with the
CAPX tests, the coe±cient on V=P in the second regression shows that the direct e®ect
of V=P on R&D (¡1:002) is highly signi¯cant (t = ¡4:28). Furthermore, the coe±cient
of 0.438 (t = 4:34) on c EI indicates that the indirect e®ect of V=P on R&D through
equity issuance is also highly signi¯cant. Not surprisingly given these results, in the
reduced form equation for R&D, the coe±cient indicating the total e®ect of V=P on
R&D, ¡2:426 (t = ¡8:40) is highly signi¯cant.
Overall, the R&D ¯ndings provide strong evidence that misvaluation a®ects intan-
gible investment both through the equity channel, and directly. This suggests that
overvaluation encourages R&D both by reducing the ¯rm's cost of capital, and by en-
25couraging managers to cater in order to boost the short-term stock price. The stronger
¯ndings on catering incentives for R&D than for capital expenditures makes sense, be-
cause there is more room for overoptimistic investor perceptions about highly uncertain
exploratory projects (R&D) than for more routine projects (capital expenditures).
The third bank of regressions show the e®ect of misvaluation on total investment
(TOTINV ) occurring through the di®erent channels. As with the R&D tests, the evi-
dence for TOTINV strongly support the conclusion that misvaluation a®ects investment
both through the equity channel, and directly.
Speci¯cally, out of the full e®ect of V=P on TOTINV (¡2:653), just ¡1:414, or
53.3%, comes from the direct e®ect. Thus, close to half of the total misvaluation e®ect
occurs through catering, and half though the equity channel. In comparison with Table
7 which treated equity issuance as exogenous (see model (4)), we see that neglecting the
endogeneity of equity issuance causes strong overestimation of the direct e®ect of V=P
on investment, and severe underestimation of the strength of the equity channel.
4.2 Subsample Tests
Di®erent versions of the misvaluation hypothesis o®er interesting predictions about the
sensitivity of investment to misvaluation in di®erent subsamples of ¯rms. We therefore
perform several subsample tests.
One set of tests involves examining separately ¯rms that are in di®erent misvaluation
quintiles. When a ¯rm is undervalued, ¯xed costs of equity issuance may limit equity-
¯nanced investment. If undervalued ¯rms issue less equity (see Loughran and Ritter
(1995), Baker and Wurgler (2000), Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003), Dong, Hirshleifer,
and Teoh (2007)), then a reduction in the undervaluation may not increase equity is-
suance and investment much. In contrast, if ¯rms that are overvalued often issue equity,
then an increase in overvaluation is likely to increase the scale of issuance and invest-
ment among issuers substantially. Similarly, if projects have a minimum technologically
e±cient scale, then a reduction in undervaluation may matter little for an inframarginal
project that is being rejected anyway, whereas an increase in overvaluation is likely to
increase the scale of the adopted project.
An alternative reasoning based upon catering potentially yields a similar implica-
tion. Managers of overvalued ¯rms may be particularly anxious to undertake overvalued
investments in order to satisfy investors' overly optimistic perceptions. The prevalence
of such managerial behavior are discussed by Jensen (2005), who warns that such e®ects
26are likely to be found among overvalued ¯rms.
Thus, arguments based upon the equity channel and based upon catering both imply
that investment will be more sensitive to valuation among overvalued ¯rms. We test
these ideas by measuring the investment sensitivity to misvaluation within subsamples
of ¯rms sorted into misvaluation quintiles.
The main empirical prediction of Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003) is that the sensi-
tivity of investment to misvaluation is strongest among equity-dependent ¯rms. We test
this by measuring investment sensitivities in subsamples sorted by the Kaplan/Zingales
index. To test for the e®ect of investor time horizon upon catering incentives (Polk and
Sapienza (2006)), we perform subsample tests sorting by turnover. Finally, we examine
how the e®ects of misvaluation on investment vary with ¯rm size.
The lower transparency and liquidity of small ¯rms implies stronger misvaluation
e®ects (see also footnote 24). However, if the cost of issuing equity for small ¯rms
is very high (so that even overvalued small ¯rms seldom issue equity), limited access
of small ¯rms to equity markets can dampen the sensitivity of their equity-¯nanced
investment to misvaluation. Furthermore, the managers of small ¯rms are likely to face
stronger pressures to cater to investor beliefs than large ¯rms, because small ¯rms are
likely to be held by a less sophisticated investor base (small investors), and are more
subject to hostile acquisitions and delisting pressures than large ¯rms when market
valuations are low. Our tests provide separate measures for the direct (catering) and
indirect (equity channel) sensitivity of investment to misvaluation. Thus, tests sorting
by ¯rm-size provide insight into the di®ering constraints and pressures faced by small
versus large ¯rms.
We report the subsample results in Tables 9-12, for each of the valuation, KZ,
turnover, and size subsamples. For each subsample, Panels A, B, and C report the
direct, indirect, and full e®ects of V=P on investment, respectively, based on the 2SLS
regressions.21
4.2.1 Valuation-Subsample Regressions
Table 9 describes the relation between investment sensitivity to misvaluation level as
measured by V=P among ¯rms in di®erent misvaluation categories. Using 2SLS estima-
21In unreported tests, we compare the OLS regressions in Table 7 models (3) and (4) to the 2SLS
results for the subsamples. For all subsamples, OLS which does not consider the endogenous e®ect
of equity issuance tends to overestimate the direct e®ect but underestimate the full e®ect of V=P on
investment, as in the full sample test.
27tion as in Section 4.1, it is evident that both the direct and indirect e®ect of V=P on
investment are almost entirely among the top 2 misvaluation quintiles, with a statisti-
cally signi¯cant inter-quintile di®erence between the top and bottom valuation quintiles
for all e®ects except for the indirect e®ect of V=P on CAPX. It is also clear that
the misvaluation e®ect on RD is much stronger than CAPX, consistent with earlier
evidence.
Furthermore, the direct e®ect of V=P on investment is stronger than the indirect
(equity issuance) e®ect, for both CAPX and RD. For CAPX, the indirect e®ect of V=P
through the equity channel is nonexistent, even for the most overvalued quintile. The
direct V=P e®ect, on the other hand, is signi¯cant among the top misvaluation quintile
(¡1:915; t = ¡2:11), with some indication of signi¯cant e®ect among quintile 2 (¡3:056;
t = ¡1:85).
For RD, the equity channel e®ect of V=P is signi¯cant only among the top valuation
quintile (¡3:901; t = ¡3:30). Although this indirect e®ect is highly signi¯cant econom-
ically and statistically, the direct e®ect is much stronger (¡9:071; t = ¡4:69). This
is what one would expect if the catering incentive is strongest when the ¯rm is highly
overvalued, as has been argued by Jensen (2005). A similar pattern exists for TOTINV .
Using 2SLS estimation as in Section 4.1, for the most overvalued quintile ¯rms (using
unreported subsample data for the most overvalued quintile), the economic impact of a
one-standard-deviation shift in misvaluation on RD is 4.46%, exceeding the equivalent
impact of a one-standard-deviation shift in cash °ow (3.28%).
Finally, the full V=P e®ect as reported in Panel C indicates that misvaluation a®ects
RD, CAPX, and total investment primarily among the top one or two overvaluation
quintiles.
4.2.2 KZ-Subsample Regressions
Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003) provide evidence that ¯nancially constrained ¯rms
have greater sensitivity of investment to misvaluation. Our tests di®er in two main
ways. First, we examine equity B=P instead of total ¯rm q, based on our argument that
it is equity misvaluation that is most relevant for equity ¯nancing decisions. Second, we
examine V=P, our misvaluation proxy that is puri¯ed of growth e®ects, along with tests
that include B=P as an additional control for growth.
Table 10 shows that, consistent with the prediction of Baker, Stein, and Wurgler
(2003), high-KZ ¯rms have capital expenditures that are more sensitive to misvaluation
(V=P) than low-KZ ¯rms. In Panel C, we see that the full V=P e®ect on CAPX is
28signi¯cant only for the highest-KZ quintile (¡1:055; t = ¡3:41). The e®ect for the
lowest-KZ quintile is nearly zero, and the di®erence in the full V=P e®ect on CAPX
between the two quintiles is statistically signi¯cant (¡1:054; t = ¡2:61). This ¯nding
re¯nes the univariate evidence and suggests that the e®ect of misvaluation on capital
spending concentrates in ¯rms with high degrees of ¯nancial constraints.
Among the highest-KZ ¯rms, the V=P e®ect comes mostly from the direct e®ect
(¡0:777; t = ¡2:56 in Panel A); the indirect e®ect is only ¡0:278; t = ¡2:00 (Panel
B), and the inter-quintile di®erence is signi¯cant only for the direct e®ect (¡0:809;
t = ¡1:98). This suggests that even for the highest-KZ ¯rms, the equity channel is only
part of the misvaluation e®ect on capital expenditures.
The relationships for R&D are stronger, and provide a sharp contrast. As with the
univariate result, low-KZ ¯rms have R&D that is highly sensitive to misvaluation as
measured by V=P. Furthermore in the multivariate tests, the R&D of low-KZ ¯rms is
more sensitive to misvaluation than the R&D of high-KZ ¯rms. In Panel C, the full e®ect
of V=P for the lowest-KZ quintile is nearly quadruple that for the highest-KZ quintile,
with a signi¯cant di®erence (2:881; t = 4:69). Moreover, both the direct and indirect
e®ects of misvaluation on RD (in Panels A and B) are stronger among low-KZ ¯rms. For
example, the indirect V=P e®ect through the equity channel is stronger among low-KZ
¯rms (¡1:580; t = ¡2:65) than among high-KZ ¯rms (insigni¯cant).
Finally, consistent with the univariate evidence, high-KZ ¯rms have total investment
that is less sensitive to misvaluation than low-KZ ¯rms. For example, the full V=P e®ect
on TOTINV for the lowest-KZ quintile is ¡4:302 (t = ¡8:29), more than double the
e®ect among the highest-KZ quintile (¡1:709; t = ¡4:96).
Thus, even more strongly than the univariate tests, the multivariate evidence sup-
ports the Baker, Stein, and Wurgler ¯nancial constraints theory as applied to tangible
investments (capital expenditures). However, the multivariate tests also con¯rm strongly
that other forces are operating when it comes to the relation between misvaluation and
intangible investment (R&D).
Why is the R&D of unconstrained (low-KZ) ¯rms especially sensitive to misvalu-
ation? And why are the e®ects of ¯nancial constraints on misvaluation sensitivity so
di®erent for tangible versus intangible investment? A plausible explanation is that ¯rms
that are ¯nancially constrained are limited in their freedom to engage pro¯tably in R&D
because of the need for ¯nancial °exibility. One reason for this is that stakeholders such
as employees, suppliers, or customers may be reluctant to commit to long-term relation-
ships with a ¯rm that is subject to distress, and the inputs of such stakeholders may be
29especially important for the success of investments designed to generate intangible assets.
Furthermore, intangible investments generate real options, making it especially valuable
for the ¯rm to have the °exibility to spend heavily in the future. For example, ¯rms with
heavy R&D activity such as pharmaceutical ¯rms tend to maintain low leverage ratios,
presumably to maintain °exibility in investment. For ¯rms that are more ¯nancially
constrained, an increase in overvaluation may encourage equity issuance for purpose of
investing in R&D relatively little compared to ¯rms with low ¯nancial constraints. In
other words, if the possibility of distress greatly reduces the expected pro¯tability of a
¯rm's intangible investment, greater overvaluation may do little to make such investment
attractive.
4.2.3 Turnover-Quintile Regressions
Turning to the e®ects of investor time horizons on investment, Table 11 reports the
misvaluation e®ects on investment for the turnover quintiles. Examining the full V=P
e®ect, we see that high-turnover ¯rms have higher sensitivity than low-turnover ¯rms of
R&D to misvaluation. However, this is not the case for CAPX, for which there seems
to be no clear pattern in the V=P coe±cient across the turnover quintiles. The direct
V=P e®ect is not signi¯cant among any turnover quintile, and there is some indication
of signi¯cant indirect e®ect among low-turnover ¯rms. Thus, the univariate ¯nding that
high-turnover ¯rms have higher sensitivity of CAPX to misvaluation is not robust to
controlling other investment determinants such as B=P and cash °ow.22
R&D, on the other hand, is highly sensitive to V=P among both high and low turnover
¯rms, with a much greater full V=P e®ect (¡3:811; t = ¡8:86) for highest-turnover ¯rms
than for lowest-turnover ¯rms (¡1:813; t = ¡6:08). This higher sensitivity of RD to
misvaluation comes more from the equity channel than from the direct e®ect. The
indirect V=P e®ect is (¡2:067; t = ¡2:76) for the highest turnover quintile, which is
higher than that among lowest turnover ¯rms (¡0:657; t = ¡2:74) with a di®erence of
¡1:410 (t = 1:95). In contrast, the direct e®ect of V=P on RD is not monotonically
related to turnover. For TOTINV , there is some evidence that the direct e®ect of V P
22Polk and Sapienza (2006) ¯nd that the relation between CAPX and discretionary accruals, their
proxy for misvaluation, is strongest for ¯rms with high turnover. The lack of a clear trend in sensitivities
across turnover quintiles using V=P may come from the conservative nature of V=P as a misvaluation
proxy. Even though B=P is confounded by the e®ects of growth prospects, it does contain incremental
information about misvaluation. In a test using B=P as a misvaluation proxy, the full e®ect of B=P
on investment more than doubles moving from the lowest to the highest turnover quintiles. There are
also some other di®erences between the sample and control variables in our investment regression and
those of Polk and Sapienza's tests.
30increases with turnover, though the relation is not monotonic.
The evidence that the indirect e®ect of V=P on R&D through the equity issuance
is stronger among high turnover ¯rms suggests that the equity channel acts to reinforce
catering. Intuitively, if the market is over-enthusiastic about a ¯rm's new investment
projects, investors may expect the ¯rm to raise equity capital to undertake them. Thus,
the equity channel can be complementary with catering.
In sum, we ¯nd that there is strong evidence for catering with respect to R&D ex-
penditures. Polk and Sapienza (2006) provide evidence for catering based upon the
relation between discretionary accruals and capital expenditures being stronger among
high turnover ¯rms. We ¯nd that the relation of R&D to our overall measure of misval-
uation, V=P, is also stronger among high turnover ¯rms.
4.2.4 Size-Quintile Regressions
Table 12 reports the e®ect of V=P within quintiles sorted by total assets. Consistent
with the univariate ¯nding, for CAPX, there is no clear trend in the V=P e®ects across
the size quintiles.23
Also consistent with the univariate test, small ¯rms show a much higher sensitivity
of RD to misvaluation than do large ¯rms. For example, the full V=P e®ect on RD for
the smallest-¯rm quintile is ¡4:097 (t = ¡8:54), more than ¯ve times the e®ect for the
largest-¯rm quintile (¡0:712; t = ¡4:92). Moreover, both direct and indirect e®ects of
V=P on RD demonstrate the same strong trend with respect to size.
Why do small ¯rms have higher sensitivity of R&D to misvaluation? First, small
¯rms may be more prone to misvaluation because of lower availability of information
to investors and lower liquidity.24 Moreover, the opaqueness of small ¯rms may apply
especially strongly to R&D projects, implying a greater impact of misvaluation on R&D
for small ¯rms.
Since small ¯rms have less access to external equity, the ¯nding that the indirect
e®ect of V=P on R&D (through the equity channel) is stronger for small ¯rms suggests
23There is an interesting U-shaped relation between the indirect V=P e®ect on CAPX and size. One
interpretation may be related to ¯nancial constraints. Small ¯rms tend to be constrained so the equity
channel e®ect is expected to be larger; however, small ¯rms may have limited access to external capital.
Thus the misvaluation e®ect on capital expenditures through the equity channel can be strongest among
mid-sized ¯rms.
24To the extent that small ¯rms are more prone to misvaluation, the signal-to-noise ratio for a
misvaluation proxy should be higher among small ¯rms, implying a stronger relation between measured
misvaluation and investment.
31that overvaluation helps ¯rms that would otherwise not ¯nd it easy to raise equity capital
to fund intangible projects.
Looking across the subsample analyses, we can summarize separately for tangible and
for intangible investment the importance of direct and indirect e®ects of misvaluation.
For capital expenditures, the indirect e®ect is strong only among ¯nancially constrained
¯rms, consistent with the Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003) model. The direct e®ect is
strong mainly among ¯nancially constrained ¯rms, and among overvalued ¯rms. The
strength of the direct e®ect among overvalued ¯rms is consistent with the hypothesis that
catering incentives (the pressure to maintain a high stock price) are especially strong
among overvalued ¯rms (Jensen (2005)).
For R&D, the indirect (equity channel) e®ect of misvaluation is strongest among
¯rms that are less ¯nancially constrained, and for the kinds of ¯rms for which we expect
the direct e®ect (catering) on intangible investment to be strongest|¯rms that are
overvalued, have higher turnover, and are smaller. The fact that this indirect e®ect
is stronger among such ¯rms suggests that equity issuance in response to misvaluation
tends to reinforce the e®ect of catering. As argued earlier, there is reason to expect the
equity channel to be complementary with catering incentives.
5 Conclusion
We examine the relation between corporate investment| capital expenditures and R&D|
and equity misvaluation as measured by book/price (B=P), or by the ratio of residual
income valuation to price (V=P). We draw our main inferences using V=P, because
V=P allows us to determine whether a relation between a market misvaluation proxy
and corporate investment is due to the e®ects of mispricing rather than pro¯t growth
prospects.
We ¯nd, consistent with the misvaluation hypothesis, that capital expenditures and,
very strongly, R&D, are positively related to the degree of overvaluation, after controlling
for several other investment determinants. The stronger e®ect on R&D is consistent with
the hypothesis that misvaluation e®ects are stronger for investments that are harder to
value. We ¯nd that misvaluation a®ects investment both through the equity channel,
and, consistent with Polk and Sapienza (2006), through direct catering. We con¯rm
this in tests that address the fact that equity issuance endogenously depends upon
misvaluation.
32To further probe the economic sources of these e®ects, we examine whether the e®ects
of misvaluation on capital expenditures and R&D di®er in subsamples of ¯rms in which
the degree of misvaluation, the degree of ¯nancial constraint, the investor time horizon,
or ¯rm size di®er. We discuss several reasons why misvaluation e®ects should be stronger
among more overvalued ¯rms, and ¯nd empirically that misvaluation a®ects investment
only among the top one or two overvaluation quintiles.
We ¯nd that the capital expenditures of ¯nancially constrained ¯rms (with high
KZ index) are more sensitive to market misvaluation than that of non-distressed ¯rms,
consistent with the theory of Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003). In contrast, we ¯nd that
the R&D expenditures of ¯nancially constrained ¯rms are much less sensitive to market
misvaluation than those of unconstrained ¯rms. This ¯nding presents an intriguing
puzzle. We suggest that the explanation is that the bene¯ts to exploiting overvaluation to
¯nance intangible growth opportunities may be lower when ¯nancial constraints reduce
°exibility and the willingness of stakeholders to provide complementary inputs.
In tests for the e®ect of investor time horizon, we ¯nd that the sensitivity of R&D,
but not capital expenditures, to valuation is higher among high-turnover ¯rms. This
suggests that catering pressures to maintain short-term valuation are more relevant for
intangible than for tangible investment, consistent with the hypothesis that intangible
investments are more prone to being misvalued by investors.
Owing to the greater opaqueness and lower liquidity of small ¯rms, small ¯rms should
be more prone to misvaluation than large ¯rms, which suggests greater misvaluation
e®ects on investment for small ¯rms. For the equity channel, however, a potentially
opposing e®ect is that large ¯rms have greater access to equity markets than small
¯rms. If overvaluation stimulates investment through equity issuance, the e®ect could
be greater among large ¯rms.
Empirically, we ¯nd that small ¯rms do not have a higher sensitivity of capital ex-
penditures to misvaluation than do large ¯rms, but do have a much higher sensitivity of
R&D to misvaluation in both the direct e®ect of misvaluation and through the equity
channel. A possible explanation is that the pressure to cater is especially important for
intangible investment and for small ¯rms. (The greater sensitivity of R&D to misvalua-
tion among small ¯rms through the equity channel could be because equity issuance is
complementary with such catering.)
We explore the conditions a®ecting the relative strength of the direct e®ect of mis-
valuation (catering in order to increase the current stock price) versus the indirect ef-
fect through equity issuance. For capital expenditures, the indirect e®ect is strong
33only among ¯nancially constrained ¯rms, consistent with the Baker, Stein, and Wurgler
(2003) model. The direct e®ect is strong mainly among ¯nancially constrained ¯rms,
and among overvalued ¯rms. The strength of the direct e®ect among overvalued ¯rms
is consistent with the hypothesis that catering incentives are especially strong among
overvalued ¯rms (Jensen (2005)).
For R&D, the indirect (equity channel) e®ect of misvaluation is strongest among
¯rms that are ¯nancially unconstrained, and for the kinds of ¯rms for which we expect
the direct e®ect (catering) on intangible investment to be strongest| ¯rms that are
overvalued, have higher turnover, and are smaller. The fact that this indirect e®ect
is stronger among such ¯rms suggests that equity issuance in response to misvaluation
tends to reinforce the e®ect of catering. This is reasonable, since raising equity capital
to invest should be complementary with the decision to invest to cater to optimistic
investor expectations.
In sum, we ¯nd that there is strong evidence in favor of the misvaluation hypoth-
esis using an overall measure of market misvaluation that ¯lters out earnings growth
prospects by using a forward-looking fundamental measure; the e®ects of misvaluation
are very di®erent for tangible and intangible investment; and that conditional tests
provide further insight into the sources of misvaluation e®ects.
The evidence of strong misvaluation e®ects on investment in the cross-section raises
the question of whether misvaluation drives aggregate patterns of corporate investment
activity as well. As discussed in the introduction, the methods used in existing studies
have not been able to resolve sharply whether the relation between stock prices and
investment derives from rational e®ects or misvaluation. The use of an overall aggregate
misvaluation proxy from which contaminating growth e®ects are removed, and the sep-
arate examination of tangible versus intangible investment, may help resolve whether
and why misvaluation a®ects corporate investment in the macro-economy.
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Table 1. Summary Statistics of Investment, Valuation, and Control Variables 
The sample includes U.S. non-financial firms listed on NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ with COMPUSTAT and I/B/E/S 
coverage during 1977-2005. The investment variables include capital expenditures (CAPX), R&D expenditures (RD), and 
total investment expenditures (TOTINV) (sum of the two), all scaled by lagged assets for each fiscal year. q is Tobin’s q 
ratio measured as market value of equity plus total assets minus book value of equity over total assets. CF is cash flow 
(Item 14 + Item 18 + RD) over the fiscal year scaled by lagged assets (missing RD is set to zero in the CF calculation). 
Leverage (LEV) is defined as (Item 9 + Item 34)/(Item 9 + Item 34 + Item 216). EI is equity issuance (∆Item 60 + ∆Item 
74 –∆Item 36) during the fiscal year, scaled by lagged assets. SIGMA is the monthly stock return volatility during the five 
year period (or, at least two years) preceding the fiscal year. B/P is the book equity to price ratio. V/P is the residual-
income-value to price ratio. KZ index is a measure of financial constraints as defined in Kaplan and Zingales (1997) but 
with q omitted, with high index indicating high level of constraints. Turnover is monthly trading volume scaled by the 
number of shares outstanding. Except for the investment variables in Panel A, and cash flow (CF) and equity issuance 
(EI) in Panel B, which are measured over each fiscal year, all other control variables, valuation variables, and valuation 
sensitivity variables are measured in the month preceding the beginning of each fiscal year. We choose the most recent 
fiscal year accounting data available at the end of June each year so that each sample firm appears once for a particular 




   N  Mean Std  Dev  Median  Min  Max 
Panel A. Investment Variables   
CAPX (%)  52,980  8.72 8.75 6.23 0.33  47.60 
RD (%)  30,698 7.64  10.88  3.64  0  58.50 
TOTINV (%)  30,324  15.56 12.96 11.93  1.18  68.95 
Panel B. Control Variables for Investment Regressions 
q  51,422  2.126 2.165 1.400 0.591  14.196 
CF (%)  53,262  12.51 13.65 11.94 -31.52 50.22 
LEV  53,160  0.31 0.23 0.30  0  0.87 
EI (%)  50,779 7.01  43.06  0.98 -13.91  119.59 
SIGMA (%)  49,386  13.25 6.76 11.82 4.29 37.33 
Panel C. Valuation Variables 
B/P  53,354  0.669 0.607 0.515 0.042 3.259 
V/P  53,354  0.733 0.672 0.628 -0.958 3.552 
Panel D. Variables Affecting the Investment-Valuation Sensitivity 
KZ Index   49,503  0.04 1.21 0.09 -4.15 2.39 
Turnover (%)  51,936 10.01  11.89  5.72  0.49  60.79 
Total Assets  ($M)  53,354 2,615.5  11,966.4 385.9  13.5  34,531.2 
 
                                                   39
 Table 2. Capital and R&D Expenditures, and Valuations by Year  
 
This table reports the mean values of investment levels: capital expenditures (CAPX), R&D expenditures (RD), total 
investment expenditures (TOTINV) (sum of the two), and cash flow (CF), all scaled by lagged total assets for each fiscal 
year. Also reported are the mean and median of B/P, the book equity to price ratio; and V/P, the residual-income-value to 
price ratio. Each sample firm appears once for a particular year. N is the number of observations each year with non-






















1977  545  9.84  2.91  12.04  14.38    1.036 0.919 0.808 0.753 
1978  770  10.60  3.14  12.80  15.28    0.807 0.709 0.756 0.704 
1979  877  11.89  3.30  14.24  15.93    0.862 0.769 0.740 0.711 
1980  1,257  11.67  3.29  14.10  15.36    0.981 0.862 0.647 0.636 
1981  1,346  11.61  3.51  14.29  14.40    0.935 0.804 0.542 0.521 
1982  1,344  11.79  3.61  14.10  14.10    0.921 0.782 0.479 0.445 
1983  1,356  9.96  3.92  13.02  12.35    0.922 0.802 0.613 0.559 
1984  1,457  8.67  4.49  12.85  12.95    0.895 0.770 0.631 0.588 
1985  1,561  10.30  5.13  15.13  13.56    0.625 0.539 0.464 0.397 
1986  1,766  10.35  5.65  15.78  12.48    0.738 0.632 0.712 0.648 
1987  1,751  9.56  5.65  14.98  11.69    0.677 0.583 0.634 0.591 
1988  1,735  8.78  5.52  13.89  12.51    0.631 0.531 0.659 0.613 
1989  1,754  8.86  5.92  14.32  13.51    0.679 0.551 0.867 0.738 
1990  1,783  8.82  6.26  14.45  13.68    0.650 0.548 0.733 0.689 
1991  1,864  8.66  6.70  14.84  12.66    0.638 0.531 0.629 0.597 
1992  1,821  7.79  6.47  13.93  12.37    0.820 0.632 0.795 0.727 
1993  1,876  7.75  7.25  14.55  13.05    0.662 0.520 0.814 0.744 
1994  1,955  8.33  8.14  16.15  12.76    0.585 0.468 0.877 0.782 
1995  2,140  8.90  8.95  17.13  13.68    0.524 0.417 0.875 0.786 
1996  2,379  9.32  9.37  17.91  13.50    0.552 0.444 0.825 0.780 
1997  2,546  9.45  9.52  18.31  13.49    0.527 0.392 0.750 0.645 
1998  2,660  9.56  10.09  18.33  12.97    0.480 0.366 0.641 0.529 
1999  2,812  9.24  10.82  18.73  12.09    0.456 0.349 0.595 0.516 
2000  2,655  8.06  10.46  17.74  12.41    0.576 0.425 0.700 0.576 
2001  2,425  8.27  10.39  18.07  12.54    0.613 0.429 0.663 0.526 
2002  2,312  6.85  8.44  14.53  7.55   0.735 0.430 0.618 0.479 
2003  2,287  5.37  9.19  13.78  7.38   0.689 0.457 0.793 0.601 
2004  2,173  5.32  9.14  13.59  10.45    0.818 0.577 1.208 1.062 
2005  2,147  5.77  8.83  13.79  12.59    0.503 0.393 0.987 0.711 
All  53,354  8.72  7.64  15.56  12.51    0.669 0.515 0.733 0.628 
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Table 3. Investment Activities of Firms Sorted by Valuation Measures: Full Sample 
 
The sample includes U.S. non-financial firms listed on NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ that are covered by COMPUSTAT 
and I/B/E/S during 1977-2005. Each year, firms are sorted into quintile portfolios according to the beginning-of-fiscal-
year book to price ratio (B/P), or residual-income-model-value to price ratio (V/P). The valuation portfolios are formed 
annually and include firms with no restriction on fiscal year-end month. Each year, mean investment levels are computed 
for each valuation quintile. Finally, time-series mean of the investment levels for each quintile is computed. This table 
reports the time-series mean of capital expenditures (CAPX), R&D expenditures (RD), and total investment expenditures 
(TOTINV) (sum of the two), all scaled by lagged total assets for each fiscal year, for each valuation portfolio. Difference 
in investment levels between the most over- and under-valued portfolios, and the associated t-statistic of the difference, 
are also reported. N is the time-series average number of firms in each portfolio with non-missing CAPX or RD or both. 
The bottom row in each panel reports the time-series mean of the yearly investment-valuation sensitivity ratio, defined as 
the ratio of interquintile spread in investment to the spread in valuation (measured by either B/P or V/P) for each 
investment category.  
 
Valuation Portfolio  N  Valuation Ratio  CAPX (%)  RD (%)  TOTINV (%) 
Sorting by B/P 
1  (Overvalued)  367.7 0.189 12.20 10.10 21.49 
2 368.1  0.380  9.87  6.90  15.71 
3 368.1  0.574  9.06  5.73  13.74 
4 368.1  0.815  7.90  5.32  12.30 
5  (Undervalued)  367.8  1.584 6.02 4.56 9.98 
Difference 1 – 5    -1.395  6.18  5.54  11.51 
(t-statistic)      (12.71) (10.01) (20.89) 
∆Investment / ∆(B/P)      4.53 4.25 8.65 
Sorting by V/P 
1  (Overvalued)  367.7 0.073 10.13 11.92 21.32 
2 368.1  0.418  9.61  6.95  15.82 
3 368.1  0.645  8.80  4.93  12.79 
4 368.1  0.921  8.52  3.95  11.70 
5 (Undervalued)  367.8  1.573  8.01  3.62  10.75 
Difference 1 – 5    -1.500  2.12  8.30  10.58 
(t-statistic)     (4.64)  (9.09)  (14.90) 
∆Investment / ∆(V/P)      2.12 5.32 7.52 
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Table 4. Investment Activities of Firms Sorted by Valuation Measures: KZ Subsamples 
 
Each year, firms are sorted into quintile portfolios according to the beginning-of-fiscal-year book to price ratio (B/P), or 
residual-income-model-value to price ratio (V/P). The valuation portfolios are formed annually and include firms with no 
restriction on fiscal year-end month. Each year, mean investment levels are computed for each valuation quintile. Finally, 
time-series mean of the investment levels for each quintile is computed. This table reports the time-series mean of capital 
expenditures (CAPX), R&D expenditures (RD), and total investment expenditures (TOTINV) (sum of the two), all scaled 
by lagged total assets for each fiscal year, for each valuation portfolio. Difference in investment levels between the most 
over- and under-valued portfolios, and the associated t-statistic of the difference, are also reported. N is the time-series 
average number of firms in each portfolio with non-missing CAPX or RD or both. Panels A and B report results for 
subsamples sorted by the beginning-of-fiscal-year Kaplan-Zingales (1997) financial constraints index (omitting q from 
the index). The bottom row in panels A and B reports the time-series mean of the yearly investment-valuation sensitivity 
ratio, defined as the ratio of interquintile spread in investment to the spread in valuation (measured by either B/P or V/P) 
for each investment category. Panel C reports the time-series mean and associated t-statistic of the difference in 
investment-valuation sensitivity ratio between the high and low KZ subsamples.  
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Table 4. Continued. 
 Panel A. Subsample of high (above median) KZ index.  
Valuation Portfolio  N  Valuation Ratio  CAPX (%)  RD (%)  TOTINV (%) 
Sorting by B/P 
1 (Overvalued)  170.2  0.234  13.16  7.37  19.07 
2 171.0  0.472  10.24  4.14  12.75 
3 170.7  0.687  8.97  3.62  11.11 
4  171.0  0.955 7.63 3.27 9.98 
5  (Undervalued)  170.4  1.847 5.55 2.72 7.66 
Difference 1 – 5    -1.613  7.61  4.65  11.40 
(t-statistic)     (9.95)  (9.53)  (14.79) 
∆Investment / ∆(B/P)      4.72 3.12 7.28 
Sorting by V/P 
1 (Overvalued)  170.2  0.120  10.44  7.77  17.15 
2 171.0  0.490  10.06  4.50  13.01 
3 170.7  0.729  8.82  3.00  10.54 
4  171.0  1.019 8.32 2.73 9.91 
5  (Undervalued)  170.4  1.694 7.92 2.73 9.56 
Difference 1 – 5    -1.574  2.53  5.05  7.59 
(t-statistic)     (5.05)  (9.05)  (12.88) 
∆Investment / ∆(V/P)      2.25 3.25 5.52 
 
Panel B. Subsample of low (below median) KZ index. 
Valuation Portfolio  N  Valuation Ratio  CAPX (%)  RD (%)  TOTINV (%) 
Sorting by B/P 
1  (Overvalued)  170.3 0.176 11.16 11.01 21.85 
2 171.0  0.333  9.21  7.97  16.70 
3 170.9  0.490  8.70  7.03  15.19 
4 171.0  0.693  7.76  6.62  13.93 
5 (Undervalued)  170.5  1.262  6.47  6.36  12.39 
Difference 1 – 5    -1.086  4.69  4.65  9.46 
(t-statistic)     (19.85)  (9.41)  (18.72) 
∆Investment / ∆(B/P)      4.47 4.52 9.14 
Sorting by V/P 
1  (Overvalued)  170.3 0.082  9.50  13.38 22.61 
2 171.0  0.385  8.88  8.19  16.73 
3 170.9  0.577  8.50  6.41  14.46 
4 171.0  0.828  8.33  4.96  12.94 
5 (Undervalued)  170.5  1.422  8.11  4.51  11.99 
Difference 1 – 5    -1.340  1.39  8.87  10.62 
(t-statistic)     (3.16)  (9.39)  (14.85) 
∆Investment / ∆(V/P)      1.74 6.35 8.32 
 
Panel C. Difference in investment-valuation sensitivity ratio between high and low KZ subsamples. 
      CAPX (%)  RD (%)  TOTINV (%) 
Sorting by B/P 
High – Low KZ      0.24  -1.40  -1.85 
(t-statistic)     (0.84)  (-3.70)  (-3.61) 
Sorting by V/P 
High – Low KZ      0.51  -3.10  -2.80 
(t-statistic)     (1.89)  (-7.80)  (-5.16)   43
Table 5. Investment Activities of Firms Sorted by Valuation Measures: Turnover Subsamples 
 
Each year, firms are sorted into quintile portfolios according to the beginning-of-fiscal-year book to price ratio (B/P), or 
residual-income-model-value to price ratio (V/P). The valuation portfolios are formed annually and include firms with no 
restriction on fiscal year-end month. Each year, mean investment levels are computed for each valuation quintile. Finally, 
time-series mean of the investment levels for each quintile is computed. This table reports the time-series mean of capital 
expenditures (CAPX), R&D expenditures (RD), and total investment expenditures (TOTINV) (sum of the two), all scaled 
by lagged total assets for each fiscal year, for each valuation portfolio. Difference in investment levels between the most 
over- and under-valued portfolios, and the associated t-statistic of the difference, are also reported. N is the time-series 
average number of firms in each portfolio with non-missing CAPX or RD or both. Panels A and B report results for 
subsamples sorted by the beginning-of-fiscal-year share turnover (monthly trading volume divided by shares 
outstanding). The bottom row in panels A and B reports the time-series mean of the yearly investment-valuation 
sensitivity ratio, defined as the ratio of interquintile spread in investment to the spread in valuation (measured by either 
B/P or V/P) for each investment category. Panel C reports the time-series mean and associated t-statistic of the difference 
in investment-valuation sensitivity ratio between the high and low turnover subsamples.    44
Table 5. Continued. 
Panel A. Subsample of high (above median) share turnover. 
Valuation Portfolio  N  Valuation Ratio  CAPX (%)  RD (%)  TOTINV (%) 
Sorting by B/P 
1  (Overvalued)  178.7 0.168 13.29 11.46 23.82 
2 179.3  0.335  10.68  8.67  18.31 
3 179.1  0.509  9.83  7.20  15.62 
4 179.3  0.745  8.40  6.49  13.79 
5 (Undervalued)  178.8  1.516  6.26  5.53  11.04 
Difference 1 – 5    -1.347  7.03  5.93  12.78 
(t-statistic)     (12.37)  (9.74)  (20.49) 
∆Investment / ∆(B/P)     5.21  4.87  10.00 
Sorting by V/P 
1  (Overvalued)  178.7 0.044 10.54 13.30 23.04 
2 179.3  0.351  10.51  8.73  18.43 
3 179.1  0.541  9.60  6.76  15.22 
4 179.3  0.782  9.30  4.96  13.06 
5 (Undervalued)  178.8  1.419  8.52  4.45  12.09 
Difference 1 – 5    -1.375  2.02  8.86  10.95 
(t-statistic)     (3.74)  (8.78)  (13.99) 
∆Investment / ∆(V/P)      2.25 6.21 8.39 
 
Panel B. Subsample of low (below median) share turnover. 
Valuation Portfolio  N  Valuation Ratio  CAPX (%)  RD (%)  TOTINV (%) 
Sorting by B/P 
1 (Overvalued)  178.8  0.243  10.15  6.81  16.09 
2 179.3  0.460  9.07  4.68  12.80 
3 179.4  0.657  8.43  4.36  11.89 
4 179.3  0.886  7.52  4.10  10.72 
5  (Undervalued)  178.9  1.652 5.79 3.93 9.22 
Difference 1 – 5    -1.408  4.35  2.88  6.87 
(t-statistic)     (12.90)  (7.32)  (15.75) 
∆Investment / ∆(B/P)      3.24 2.12 5.11 
Sorting by V/P 
1 (Overvalued)  178.8  0.134  8.73  8.70  16.48 
2 179.3  0.530  8.44  4.50  12.12 
3 179.4  0.771  8.07  3.52  11.00 
4 179.3  1.050  8.02  3.20  10.64 
5  (Undervalued)  178.9  1.671 7.71 3.19 9.90 
Difference 1 – 5    -1.537  1.02  5.51  6.58 
(t-statistic)     (3.27)  (7.07)  (11.02) 
∆Investment / ∆(V/P)      1.03 3.29 4.45 
 
Panel C. Difference in investment-valuation sensitivity ratio between high and low turnover subsamples. 
      CAPX (%)  RD (%)  TOTINV (%) 
Sorting by B/P 
High – Low Turnover      1.97  2.74  4.88 
(t-statistic)      (9.15) (4.76) (8.34) 
Sorting by V/P 
High – Low Turnover      1.22  2.92  3.94 
(t-statistic)      (2.64) (7.17) (7.95)   45
Table 6. Investment Activities of Firms Sorted by Valuation Measures: Size Subsamples 
 
Each year, firms are sorted into quintile portfolios according to the beginning-of-fiscal-year book to price ratio (B/P), or 
residual-income-model-value to price ratio (V/P). The valuation portfolios are formed annually and include firms with no 
restriction on fiscal year-end month. Each year, mean investment levels are computed for each valuation quintile. Finally, 
time-series mean of the investment levels for each quintile is computed. This table reports the time-series mean of capital 
expenditures (CAPX), R&D expenditures (RD), and total investment expenditures (TOTINV) (sum of the two), all scaled 
by lagged total assets for each fiscal year, for each valuation portfolio. Difference in investment levels between the most 
over- and under-valued portfolios, and the associated t-statistic of the difference, are also reported. N is the time-series 
average number of firms in each portfolio with non-missing CAPX or RD or both. Panels A and B report results for 
subsamples sorted by the beginning-of-fiscal-year firm size (total assets). The bottom row in panels A and B reports the 
time-series mean of the yearly investment-valuation sensitivity ratio, defined as the ratio of interquintile spread in 
investment to the spread in valuation (measured by either B/P or V/P) for each investment category. Panel C reports the 
time-series mean and associated t-statistic of the difference in investment-valuation sensitivity ratio between the large and 
small size subsamples.    46
Table 6. Continued. 
Panel A. Subsample of large firms (above median total assets). 
Valuation Portfolio  N  Valuation Ratio  CAPX (%)  RD (%)  TOTINV (%) 
Sorting by B/P 
1 (Overvalued)  183.6  0.230  11.30  6.40  16.92 
2 184.2  0.429  9.84  3.86  12.54 
3 184.1  0.612  9.02  3.33  11.26 
4 184.2  0.817  8.01  3.20  10.66 
5  (Undervalued)  183.6  1.556 6.28 2.61 8.58 
Difference 1 – 5    -1.326  5.01  3.79  8.34 
(t-statistic)      (11.73) (12.33) (20.66) 
∆Investment / ∆(B/P)      3.87 3.06 6.59 
Sorting by V/P 
1 (Overvalued)  183.6  0.196  10.38  6.44  16.07 
2 184.2  0.514  9.47  4.49  13.04 
3 184.1  0.733  8.51  3.30  11.00 
4 184.2  0.992  8.40  2.79  10.65 
5  (Undervalued)  183.6  1.559 7.70 2.17 9.26 
Difference 1 – 5    -1.363  2.67  4.27  6.81 
(t-statistic)     (6.96)  (11.05)  (15.40) 
∆Investment / ∆(V/P)      2.54 3.17 5.52 
 
Panel B. Subsample of small firms (below median total assets). 
Valuation Portfolio  N  Valuation Ratio  CAPX (%)  RD (%)  TOTINV (%) 
Sorting by B/P 
1  (Overvalued)  183.6 0.161 12.99 12.73 24.91 
2 184.3  0.337  10.20  9.52  18.60 
3 184.3  0.529  8.98  8.22  16.23 
4 184.3  0.808  7.73  6.91  13.53 
5 (Undervalued)  183.8  1.606  5.76  5.80  10.73 
Difference 1 – 5    -1.445  7.22  6.93  14.18 
(t-statistic)     (11.90)  (9.28)  (21.13) 
∆Investment / ∆(B/P)     5.13  5.05  10.22 
Sorting by V/P 
1 (Overvalued)  183.6  -0.022  9.99  14.82  24.09 
2 184.3  0.339  9.67  9.35  18.34 
3 184.3  0.551  8.94  7.08  15.36 
4 184.3  0.836  8.81  5.50  13.14 
5 (Undervalued)  183.8  1.561  8.25  4.66  11.67 
Difference 1 – 5    -1.583  1.74  10.15  12.42 
(t-statistic)     (2.73)  (8.79)  (14.76) 
∆Investment / ∆(V/P)      2.18 6.16 8.61 
 
Panel D. Difference in investment-valuation sensitivity ratio between large and small subsamples. 
      CAPX (%)  RD (%)  TOTINV (%) 
Sorting by B/P 
Large – Small Size      -1.26  -1.99  -3.62 
(t-statistic)      (-4.31) (-5.22) (-8.97) 
Sorting by V/P 
Large – Small Size      0.36  -3.00  -3.10 
(t-statistic)     (0.91)  (-10.28)  (-6.51)   47
Table 7. Fama-MacBeth Regressions of Investment Levels on Valuation Measures: Full Sample 
 
The dependent variable is one of following investment levels: capital expenditures (CAPX), R&D (RD), and sum of the 
expenditures (TOTINV) all scaled by lagged total assets. The independent variables include beginning-of-year V/P (the 
residual-income-model-value to price ratio) and B/P (book to price ratio). q is the beginning-of-year Tobin’s q ratio. CF is 
cash flow (Item 14 + Item 18 + RD) scaled by lagged assets (missing RD is set to zero in the CF calculation). LEV is 
beginning-of-year leverage defined as (Item 9 + Item 34)/(Item 9 + Item 34 + Item 216). SIGMA is the stock return 
volatility during the five-year period (or, at least two years) preceding the fiscal year. EI is equity issuance (∆Item 60 + 
∆Item 74 –∆Item 36) scaled by lagged assets. This table reports the time-series weighted average (first row) and t-statistic 
(second row) of the coefficients of cross-sectional regressions, where the weight is the number of firms in each yearly 
regression. X-Obs is the average number of firms in the cross-sectional regressions; there are 29 yearly cross-sectional 
regressions for each model specification. All regressions include 2-digit SIC major industry dummies. The sample 
includes U.S. non-financial firms listed on NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ with COMPUSTAT and I/B/E/S coverage 
during 1977-2005.  
  V/P B/P q CF  LEV  SIGMA  EI  Intercept  X-obs 
Dependent variable: CAPX 
(1)    -1.566 0.428 0.191 3.106 0.088    3.595  1618.2 
    (-9.59)  (4.72)  (11.63)  (5.35)  (8.68)  (5.98)  
           
(2)  -0.479    0.603 0.207 3.127 0.070    2.560  1618.2 
  (-3.40)   (7.13)  (11.84)  (5.39)  (6.60)  (4.62)  
           
(3)  -0.429  -1.912  0.203  2.701  0.112  4.520  1681.9 
  (-2.74)  (-9.50)   (12.11)  (4.46)  (8.42)  (6.78)  
           
(4)  -0.313 -1.748    0.199 2.549 0.073 0.082 4.676  1598.0 
  (-2.15) (-9.48)    (13.49)  (4.78) (6.13) (7.76) (7.45)   
           
Dependent variable: RD 
(1)    0.364 0.428 0.134 -5.328 0.467    -1.618 920.5 
   (3.12)  (6.23)  (11.40)  (-5.26)  (8.89)    (-3.63)   
           
(2)  -1.745   0.260  0.135  -4.712  0.441  0.389  920.5 
  (-6.87)   (3.43)  (13.15)  (-5.01)  (8.57)  (0.84)  
           
(3)  -1.999  0.088  0.149  -5.263  0.458  0.738  964.5 
  (-7.89)  (0.46)   (13.85)  (-5.38)  (8.41)  (1.19)  
           
(4)  -1.737  0.685    0.159 -4.926 0.372 0.084 0.644 907.9 
  (-8.24)  (4.37)    (17.20)  (-5.14) (8.99) (6.38) (1.10)   
           
Dependent variable: TOTINV  
(1)    -1.039 0.991 0.272 -3.347 0.482    2.951 908.9 
    (-4.61) (8.56) (12.02)  (-2.45) (9.49)    (3.06)   
           
(2)  -2.139   0.954  0.284  -2.733  0.444  4.068  908.9 
  (-7.01)   (8.53)  (13.49)  (-2.16)  (9.18)  (4.23)  
           
(3)  -2.453  -1.838  0.305  -3.714  0.507  6.382  952.6 
  (-8.36)  (-5.90)   (12.95)  (-2.76)  (9.29)  (5.27)  
           
(4)  -2.063 -1.088    0.313 -3.552 0.384 0.154 6.507 896.5 
 (-8.30)  (-4.94)  (15.20)  (-2.90)  (10.11)  (13.21)  (5.76)     48
  
Table 8. Fama-MacBeth 2-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) Investment Regressions: Full Sample 
 
The dependent investment variables include capital expenditures (CAPX), R&D (RD), and sum of the expenditures 
(TOTINV) all scaled by lagged total assets. The independent variables include beginning-of-year V/P (the residual-
income-model-value to price ratio) and B/P (book to price ratio); see Table 7 for definition of other control variables. 
Each year, 2-stage least squares (2SLS) cross-sectional regressions are performed for model (4) in Table 7, with equity 
issuance (EI) being an endogenous variable. The first-stage EI regression includes 2-digit SIC major industry dummies in 
addition to the exogenous variables (V/P, B/P, CF, LEV, and SIGMA) in the independent variables. In the second-stage 
investment regression, the endogenous variable EI is the predicted value from the first-stage regression. This table reports 
results of the EI and investment regressions, as well as the reduced form investment regression for each investment 
(CAPX, RD, and TOTINV). The system of equations for the 2SLS for each investment variable is presented first, followed 
by the time-series weighted average (first row) and t-statistic (second row) of the coefficients, where the weight is the 
number of firms in each yearly regression. X-Obs is the average number of firms in the cross-sectional regressions; there 
are 29 yearly cross-sectional regressions for each model specification. The sample includes U.S. non-financial firms listed 
on NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ with COMPUSTAT and I/B/E/S coverage during 1977-2005.  
 
Dependent Variable  V/P B/P CF LEV  SIGMA  EI  Intercept  X-obs 
                                     
          
EI  -2.222 -4.537 -0.022 -0.581 0.739    -0.418 1598.0 
  (-5.47) (-5.67) (-0.51) (-0.48) (7.08)    (-0.39)   
          
CAPX  -0.094  -1.904 0.152 3.750 0.018 0.165 5.984  1598.0 
  (-0.37)  (-5.83) (9.26) (5.71) (0.40) (2.42) (8.10)   
          
CAPX  -0.258  -1.972 0.194 4.862 0.074    4.997  1598.0 
(Reduced  form)  (-1.43)  (-10.79)  (11.33)  (6.74)  (4.82)  (7.06)  
          
 
               
EI  -3.018 -5.785 -0.047 -1.071 0.914    -1.387 907.9 
  (-5.07) (-5.21) (-0.95) (-0.84) (6.47)    (-0.74)   
          
RD  -1.002 2.893 0.228 -4.405 0.093 0.438 -1.036 907.9 
  (-4.28) (5.11) (12.86)  (-4.23) (1.76) (4.34) (-1.76)   
          
RD  -2.426 -0.195 0.158 -5.995 0.486    0.437 907.9 
(Reduced  form)  (-8.40)  (-0.71)  (12.09)  (-6.02)  (8.64)  (0.61)  
          
          
 
                               
EI  -3.054 -5.770 -0.045 -1.175 0.914    -1.325 896.5 
  (-5.11) (-5.18) (-0.91) (-0.91) (6.55)    (-0.73)   
          
TOTINV  -1.414 0.277 0.322 -3.253 0.165 0.467 6.181 896.5 
  (-6.20) (0.64) (16.92)  (-2.76) (3.74) (5.36) (6.46)   
          
TOTINV  -2.653 -2.189 0.301 -3.811 0.517    6.406 896.5 
(Reduced  form)  (-8.01)  (-6.24)  (11.87)  (-2.75)  (9.35)  (5.17)  
            49
Table 9. Investment Sensitivity to Valuation by Valuation Level 
 
Each year, firms are sorted into valuation quintiles by the beginning-of-fiscal-year V/P level. Two-stage least squares 
(2SLS) regressions as in Table 8 are performed for each valuation quintile. For each quintile, for each of the capital 
expenditures (CAPX), R&D (RD), and sum of the expenditures (TOTINV) regressions, this table reports only the weighted 
average of the V/P coefficient (b) and the associated t-statistic in the 2SLS regressions, which measure the direct, indirect, 
or full effect of V/P on investment, where the weight is the number of firms in each cross-sectional regression. Panel A 
reports the V/P coefficient in the second-stage 2SLS investment regression (direct effect of V/P on investment), Panel C 
reports the V/P coefficient in the reduced form 2SLS regression (full effect), and Panel B the difference between the full 
and direct effects (indirect effect). The bottom row of each panel reports the difference in coefficients between quintiles 1 
and 5, based on the time-series of coefficients of the cross-sectional regressions for the two quintiles.  
 
Panel A. V/P coefficient in the 2SLS investment regression (the second regression of each of the CAPX, RD, and TOTINV 
2SLS regressions in Table 8), which measures the direct effect of V/P on investment. 
V/P Quintile  CAPX    RD     TOTINV 
  b t-statistic    b t-statistic    b t-statistic 
1 (Overvalued)  -1.915  -2.11    -9.071  -4.69    -10.094  -6.36 
2 -3.056  -1.85    -1.831  -0.63    -1.976  -0.71 
3 -1.528  -1.12    -0.488  -0.54    -2.109  -0.99 
4 0.340  0.41    0.840  1.05    -0.163  -0.14 
5 (Undervalued)  0.119  0.62    -0.091  -0.45    -0.084  -0.30 
Difference 5 – 1  2.036  2.16    8.978  4.49    10.007  6.10 
 
Panel B. V/P coefficient from the effect of EI in the 2SLS investment regressions (in Table 8 notation,  ), which 
measures the indirect effect of V/P on investment through equity issuance. 
V/P Quintile  CAPX    RD     TOTINV 
  b t-statistic    b t-statistic    b t-statistic 
1 (Overvalued)  0.243  0.52    -3.901  -3.30    -3.683  -3.53 
2 -0.722  -0.65    -3.178  -0.98    -1.960  -0.90 
3 1.018  1.15    -0.457  -0.75    -1.247  -1.54 
4 -0.301  -0.53    -0.963  -1.39    0.162  0.42 
5 (Undervalued)  0.177  1.41    0.277  1.37    0.413  1.93 
Difference 5 – 1  -0.066  -0.13    4.178  3.32    4.100  3.67 
 
Panel C. V/P coefficient in the reduced form 2SLS investment regression (the third regression of each of the CAPX, RD, 
and TOTINV 2SLS regressions in Table 8), which measures the full effect of V/P on investment. 
V/P Quintile  CAPX    RD     TOTINV 
  b t-statistic    b t-statistic    b t-statistic 
1 (Overvalued)  -1.673  -1.93    -12.973  -5.73    -13.777  -7.35 
2 -3.777  -2.55    -5.009  -3.74    -3.936  -1.67 
3 -0.510  -0.43    -0.945  -1.08    -3.356  -1.78 
4 0.039  0.05    -0.124  -0.15    -0.001  0.00 
5 (Undervalued)  0.296  1.64    0.186  0.89    0.329  1.23 
Difference 5 – 1  1.970  2.30    13.156  5.68    14.107  7.52   50
Table 10. Investment Sensitivity to Valuation for KZ Quintiles 
 
Each year, firms are sorted into KZ quintiles by the beginning-of-fiscal-year KZ index. Two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
regressions as in Table 8 are performed for each KZ quintile. For each quintile, for each of the capital expenditures 
(CAPX), R&D (RD), and sum of the expenditures (TOTINV) regressions, this table reports only the weighted average of 
the V/P coefficient (b) and the associated t-statistic in the 2SLS regressions, which measure the direct, indirect, or full 
effect of V/P on investment, where the weight is the number of firms in each cross-sectional regression. Panel A reports 
the V/P coefficient in the second-stage 2SLS investment regression (direct effect of V/P on investment), Panel C reports 
the V/P coefficient in the reduced form 2SLS regression (full effect), and Panel B the difference between the full and 
direct effects (indirect effect). The bottom row of each panel reports the difference in coefficients between quintiles 1 and 
5, based on the time-series of coefficients of the cross-sectional regressions for the two quintiles.  
 
Panel A. V/P coefficient in the 2SLS investment regression (the second regression of each of the CAPX, RD, and TOTINV 
2SLS regressions in Table 8), which measures the direct effect of V/P on investment. 
KZ  Quintile  CAPX    RD     TOTINV 
  b t-statistic    b t-statistic    b t-statistic 
1 (Unconstrained)  0.032  0.09    -2.330  -4.83    -3.115  -6.71 
2 -0.013  -0.04    -2.361  -4.50    -2.326  -4.59 
3 0.083  0.32    -1.265  -2.87    -1.598  -3.99 
4 -0.369  -1.09    -1.699  -6.35    -2.143  -5.86 
5 (Constrained)  -0.777  -2.56    -0.754  -3.51    -1.294  -4.08 
Difference 5 – 1  -0.809  -1.98    1.574  2.87    1.821  3.12 
 
Panel B. V/P coefficient from the effect of EI in the 2SLS investment regressions (in Table 8 notation,  ), which 
measures the indirect effect of V/P on investment through equity issuance. 
KZ  Quintile  CAPX    RD     TOTINV 
  b t-statistic    b t-statistic    b t-statistic 
1 (Unconstrained)  -0.034  -0.20    -1.580  -2.65    -1.187  -2.38 
2 -0.030  -0.13    -1.364  -3.46    -1.252  -3.21 
3 -0.106  -0.61    -1.220  -2.81    -0.988  -2.77 
4 -0.034  -0.17    -0.821  -2.43    -0.661  -1.96 
5 (Constrained)  -0.278  -2.00    -0.274  -1.48    -0.415  -2.07 
Difference 5 – 1  -0.244  -1.08    1.307  2.09    0.773  1.46 
 
Panel C. V/P coefficient in the reduced form 2SLS investment regression (the third regression of each of the CAPX, RD, 
and TOTINV 2SLS regressions in Table 8), which measures the full effect of V/P on investment. 
KZ  Quintile  CAPX    RD     TOTINV 
  b t-statistic    b t-statistic    b t-statistic 
1 (Unconstrained)  -0.002  -0.01    -3.910  -6.95    -4.302  -8.29 
2 -0.043  -0.15    -3.725  -6.61    -3.577  -5.73 
3 -0.023  -0.11    -2.484  -6.17    -2.586  -5.59 
4 -0.403  -1.49    -2.520  -5.84    -2.804  -4.98 
5 (Constrained)  -1.055  -3.41    -1.028  -5.91    -1.709  -4.96 
Difference 5 – 1  -1.054  -2.61    2.881  4.69    2.593  3.95   51
Table 11. Investment Sensitivity to Valuation for Turnover Quintiles 
 
Each year, firms are sorted into turnover quintiles by the beginning-of-fiscal-year share turnover. Two-stage least squares 
(2SLS) regressions as in Table 8 are performed for each turnover quintile. For each quintile, for each of the capital 
expenditures (CAPX), R&D (RD), and sum of the expenditures (TOTINV) regressions, this table reports only the weighted 
average of the V/P coefficient (b) and the associated t-statistic in the 2SLS regressions, which measure the direct, indirect, 
or full effect of V/P on investment, where the weight is the number of firms in each cross-sectional regression. Panel A 
reports the V/P coefficient in the second-stage 2SLS investment regression (direct effect of V/P on investment), Panel C 
reports the V/P coefficient in the reduced form 2SLS regression (full effect), and Panel B the difference between the full 
and direct effects (indirect effect). The bottom row of each panel reports the difference in coefficients between quintiles 1 
and 5, based on the time-series of coefficients of the cross-sectional regressions for the two quintiles.  
 
Panel A. V/P coefficient in the 2SLS investment regression (the second regression of each of the CAPX, RD, and TOTINV 
2SLS regressions in Table 8), which measures the direct effect of V/P on investment. 
Turnover Quintile  CAPX    RD     TOTINV 
  b t-statistic    b t-statistic    b t-statistic 
1 (Low)  -0.149  -0.72    -1.155  -3.97    -1.269  -4.78 
2 -0.404  -1.11    -1.819  -4.87    -1.958  -4.29 
3 0.526  2.54    -1.661  -5.25    -1.327  -2.99 
4 0.258  0.89    -1.086  -2.79    -1.509  -3.20 
5 (High)  -0.064  -0.16    -1.743  -3.09    -2.715  -5.73 
Difference 5 – 1  0.085  0.20    -0.588  -1.01    -1.446  -2.76 
 
Panel B. V/P coefficient from the effect of EI in the 2SLS investment regressions (in Table 8 notation,  ), which 
measures the indirect effect of V/P on investment through equity issuance. 
Turnover Quintile  CAPX    RD     TOTINV 
  b t-statistic    b t-statistic    b t-statistic 
1 (Low)  -0.178  -2.46    -0.657  -2.74    -0.648  -2.86 
2 -0.049  -0.25    -0.546  -1.38    -0.643  -1.85 
3 -0.443  -2.48    -0.604  -1.69    -0.650  -2.18 
4 -0.242  -1.17    -1.830  -3.84    -1.502  -3.67 
5 (High)  0.077  0.34    -2.067  -2.76    -1.723  -3.07 
Difference 5 – 1  0.255  1.07    -1.410  -1.95    -1.076  -1.94 
 
Panel C. V/P coefficient in the reduced form 2SLS investment regression (the third regression of each of the CAPX, RD, 
and TOTINV 2SLS regressions in Table 8), which measures the full effect of V/P on investment. 
Turnover Quintile  CAPX    RD     TOTINV 
  b t-statistic    b t-statistic    b t-statistic 
1 (Low)  -0.327  -1.56    -1.813  -6.08    -1.917  -6.18 
2 -0.454  -1.77    -2.365  -5.30    -2.601  -5.42 
3 0.083  0.37    -2.266  -5.82    -1.977  -3.91 
4 0.016  0.06    -2.915  -7.05    -3.011  -6.13 
5 (High)  0.013  0.05    -3.811  -8.86    -4.439  -9.18 
Difference 5 – 1  0.340  1.11    -1.998  -6.12    -2.521  -5.51   52
Table 12. Investment Sensitivity to Valuation for Size Quintiles 
 
Each year, firms are sorted into size quintiles by the beginning-of-fiscal-year firm sizes (total assets). Two-stage least 
squares (2SLS) regressions as in Table 8 are performed for each size quintile. For each quintile, for each of the capital 
expenditures (CAPX), R&D (RD), and sum of the expenditures (TOTINV) regressions, this table reports only the weighted 
average of the V/P coefficient (b) and the associated t-statistic in the 2SLS regressions, which measure the direct, indirect, 
or full effect of V/P on investment, where the weight is the number of firms in each cross-sectional regression. Panel A 
reports the V/P coefficient in the second-stage 2SLS investment regression (direct effect of V/P on investment), Panel C 
reports the V/P coefficient in the reduced form 2SLS regression (full effect), and Panel B the difference between the full 
and direct effects (indirect effect). The bottom row of each panel reports the difference in coefficients between quintiles 1 
and 5, based on the time-series of coefficients of the cross-sectional regressions for the two quintiles.  
 
Panel A. V/P coefficient in the 2SLS investment regression (the second regression of each of the CAPX, RD, and TOTINV 
2SLS regressions in Table 8), which measures the direct effect of V/P on investment. 
Size Quintile  CAPX    RD     TOTINV 
  b t-statistic    b t-statistic    b t-statistic 
1 (Small)  -0.048  -0.13    -2.150  -5.47    -2.462  -4.48 
2 0.280  0.92    -1.474  -4.42    -1.860  -4.09 
3 0.522  1.33    -1.952  -7.62    -2.400  -6.74 
4 -0.362  -1.26    -1.174  -4.79    -1.470  -3.54 
5 (Large)  -0.225  -1.17    -0.725  -4.82    -0.930  -3.52 
Difference 5 – 1  -0.177  -0.44    1.424  4.13    1.532  3.10 
 
Panel B. V/P coefficient from the effect of EI in the 2SLS investment regressions (in Table 8 notation,  ), which 
measures the indirect effect of V/P on investment through equity issuance. 
Size Quintile  CAPX    RD     TOTINV 
  b t-statistic    b t-statistic    b t-statistic 
1 (Small)  -0.112  -0.58    -1.946  -4.50    -2.023  -4.75 
2 -0.449  -2.34    -1.039  -3.24    -0.980  -3.30 
3 -0.829  -2.68    -0.682  -3.73    -0.834  -2.92 
4 -0.323  -2.63    -0.054  -0.40    -0.081  -0.49 
5 (Large)  -0.115  -1.45    0.013  0.23    -0.143  -1.19 
Difference 5 – 1  -0.003  -0.01    1.959  4.51    1.882  4.26 
 
Panel C. V/P coefficient in the reduced form 2SLS investment regression (the third regression of each of the CAPX, RD, 
and TOTINV 2SLS regressions in Table 8), which measures the full effect of V/P on investment. 
Size Quintile  CAPX    RD     TOTINV 
  b t-statistic    b t-statistic    b t-statistic 
1 (Small)  -0.160  -0.54    -4.097  -8.54    -4.485  -7.12 
2 -0.169  -0.66    -2.513  -6.28    -2.840  -6.95 
3 -0.307  -1.39    -2.634  -7.90    -3.235  -7.29 
4 -0.685  -2.55    -1.228  -5.50    -1.551  -4.15 
5 (Large)  -0.340  -1.87    -0.712  -4.92    -1.073  -4.10 
Difference 5 – 1  -0.180  -0.59    3.384  7.70    3.413  6.16 
 